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ARTICLES
BALANCING CONSUMER PRIVACY WITH
BEHAVIORAL TARGETING
Dustin D. Bergert
Abstract
Behavioral targeting is the emerging practice of collecting
information about consumers' behavior and using that information to
customize an advertisement or other service for the consumer. This
article first describes the practice and technology of behavioral
targeting in its various forms. Second, it aims to identify how this
emerging technology might benefit and harm consumers, and to
understand how harms occur. Third, it overviews the FTC's
self-regulatory principles and a variety of other proposals to
strengthen regulations to prevent harm to consumers and concludes
that the proposed approaches do not give consumers the right
information to effectively allow them to intelligently manage the risk
of harm. Therefore, the article proposes a regime of broad mandatory
regulation combined with an audit requirement to address the root
causes of potential harm. The article argues that this approach will
aid consumers in making informed decisions about their participation
in activities that involve behavioral targeting.
INTRODUCTION
In a 2006 article, the New York Times described how easy it was
to discover the identity of a person based on the information that a
website had collected about her. Two Times reporters obtained a set
of publicly available data describing the Internet searches of America
Online (AOL) customers.' Although the data contained no
t Dustin D. Berger (LL.M. Candidate 2011, J.D. 2009, M.B.A. 2003, B.S. Comp. Sci.
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1. Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller Jr., A Face is Exposed for AOL Searcher No.
4417749, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A2, available at
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information that directly identified the persons who had performed
the searches, the reporters were nevertheless able to use the search
data to identify and interview one of the customers.2
Thelma Arnold, a sixty-two-year-old widow who lives in
Lilburn, Georgia, conducted Internet searches for "60 single men,"
"dog that urinates on everything," and "numb fingers." When the
reporters located her, she confirmed that the searches were indeed
hers.4 Ms. Arnold, who was identified in the search data only by the
number 4417749 and the contents of the searches themselves, also
conducted a number of searches related to medical conditions, which,
she explained to the New York Times reporters, she often does on
behalf of friends.' While Ms. Arnold was indignant about AOL's
disclosure of her searches, and said she intended to drop her AOL
service,6 the damage to Ms. Arnold's privacy had been done. Now the
readers of the New York Times know of Ms. Arnold's search for "60
single men." Both Ms. Arnold and AOL were fortunate that the
information the New York Times was able to put together was only
embarrassing for Ms. Arnold.
For some time, websites and Internet service providers (ISPs)
have been compiling profiles about their customers.7 These profiles
allow websites and ISPs to serve advertisements and other services
that are targeted to their customers' interests.8 Like the profile AOL
constructed of Ms. Arnold, these profiles usually do not contain any
information, such as a name, address, or social security number, that
directly identifies the profiled customer.9 Nevertheless, profilers are
capturing and aggregating more information about consumers, and,
consequently, consumers' profiles are becoming so detailed that it is
increasingly possible to discern the identities of the consumers from
the data in the profiles.' 0 Because the profiled consumer can be
identified, the consumer may be embarrassed if his or her Internet
behavior is matched to his or her identity. And, many consumers
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id
6. Id.
7. FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING I-II (2009) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
8. Id.
9. See Barbaro & Zeller, supra note 1.
10. Id
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would be understandably indignant at the detailed picture of their
private lives that profilers possess regardless of how the profilers use
the information. Even worse, the information may also be detailed
enough to allow holders of the data to engage in identify theft or other
financial fraud.
This profiling practice is known as behavioral targeting." The
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently issued a set of self-
regulatory principles to guide advertisers that use behavioral
targeting.12 While compliance is voluntary, these self-regulatory
principles are a critical first step toward preventing the harm to
consumer privacy that profiling can cause. I will argue, however, that
the FTC's principles are inadequate to safeguard consumers' privacy
on the Internet.
Part I will explain behavioral targeting, provide some examples
of behavioral targeting, and discuss why consumer advocates are
justifiably concerned with the possibility that this technology has
substantially reduced the privacy of consumers on the Internet. It will
also show how (1) profilers' behavioral targeting efforts are often
transparent to consumers, thereby creating an information gap that
prevents aggrieved consumers from easily redressing any harm that
stems from the misuse or inappropriate disclosure of their
information, and (2) consumers lack the basic information they need
to assess the risk of participating in behavioral targeting. Part I will
also describe the compelling benefits of behavioral targeting
technology and will argue that these benefits are sufficient that the
government should not use regulation to cripple this emerging
technology.
Part II will examine the legal framework applicable to
companies that engage in behavioral targeting. It will illustrate that
(1) no existing law explicitly prohibits behavioral targeting, and (2)
that a victim of misuse of their consumer profile will find it difficult
to seek redress through either the courts or the FTC. It also will
explain how the information gap prevents effective enforcement of
applicable law to profilers.
Part III will discuss each of the FTC's recent self-regulatory
principles. It will explain why the FTC's approach is a laudable first
step because it establishes the standards of care that behavioral
marketers must follow. It will also explain why the FTC's approach
must be strengthened with oversight and enforcement.
11. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at i-ii.
12. Id. at 1-4.
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Finally, in Part IV, I will conclude with a survey of others'
proposals to strengthen privacy protections related to behavioral
targeting. I will also propose FTC enforcement of the self-regulatory
principles as mandatory regulations, widening the applicability of the
principles' requirements, and a regime of auditing oversight. These
proposals would deter misuse of behavioral targeting data, proactively
reduce the risk of harm, and give consumers and their advocates the
information they need to adequately assess the prevalence of misuse
and inappropriate disclosure. The mandatory auditing requirement
would ensure that (1) companies engaging in behavioral targeting
accurately state how they use consumer information, (2) profilers
have appropriate safeguards in place to protect consumer data, and (3)
profilers comply with the other requirements of the principles. This
proposal seeks to balance consumers' privacy interests and the
benefits to consumers and private enterprise that flow from the
beneficial use of behavioral targeting.
A variety of consumer advocacy groups and scholars have
suggested that even stronger privacy controls on consumer profiling
are needed. I will argue, however, that these proposals underestimate
the usefulness of behavioral targeting and overestimate the likelihood
of otherwise unredressable harm. Several of the stronger controls
would ultimately harm consumers by damaging the Internet business
models that offer content and services funded or otherwise enabled by
behavioral targeting.
I. BEHAVIORAL TARGETING
Behavioral targeting is the use of data about a consumer (a
"consumer profile") to provide a service customized for that
consumer. 13 Part I provides some examples of how behavioral
targeting works on the Internet and then turns to a discussion of the
risks and benefits of behavioral targeting.
A. How Behavioral Targeting Works
Because of its prevalence, behavioral advertising-behavioral
targeting used for advertising-is at the center of the debate about the
privacy implications of compiling consumer preferences. 14 Generally,
businesses that use behavioral advertising "track consumers' activities
13. Andrew Hotaling, Comment, Protecting Personally Identifying Information on the
Internet: Notice and Consent in the Age of Behavioral Advertising, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
529, 530 (2008), available at http://commlaw.cua.edu/res/docs/1l Hotaling.pdf.
14. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at i-ii.
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and associate those activities with a particular computer or device.""
At present, behavioral advertisers primarily use three approaches to
collecting consumers' information: (1) the cookie-based approach, (2)
the spyware-based approach, and (3) the deep packet inspection-based
approach. 16 Many profilers who employ behavioral targeting for
purposes other than advertising also use a fourth approach: the direct
collection or "first party" model.
The FTC recently created a simple hypothetical example of how
the most common form of behavioral targeting-cookie-based
behavioral advertising-works:
[A] consumer visits a travel website and searches for airline flights
to New York City. The consumer does not purchase any tickets,
but later visits the website of a local newspaper to read about the
Washington Nationals baseball team. While on the newspaper's
website, the consumer receives an advertisement from an airline
featuring flights from Washington D.C. to New York City. In this
simple example, the travel website where the consumer conducted
his research might have an arrangement with a network advertiser
to provide advertising to its visitors. The network advertiser places
on the consumer's computer a cookie, which is tied to non-
personally identifiable information such as the web pages the
consumer has visited, the advertisements that the consumer has
been shown, and how frequently each advertisement has been
shown. Because the newspaper's website is also part of the
advertising network, when the consumer visits the newspaper
website the network advertiser's cookie identifies the consumer as
a visitor to the travel website who likely has an interest in traveling
to New York. It then serves the corresponding advertisement for
airline flights to New York.
In a slightly more sophisticated example, the information about the
consumer's activities on the travel website could be combined with
information about the content that the consumer viewed on the
newspaper's website. The advertisement served could then be
tailored to the consumer's interest in, not just New York City, but
also baseball (e.g., an advertisement referring to the New York
Yankees).17
Cookie-based behavioral advertising relies on cookies to track
the consumer. A cookie is a named piece of data that a website sends
to a web browser, along with a request that the consumer's web
15. Id. at 2.
16. See infra Part I.A.
17. Id. at 3-4.
2011] 7
8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 27
browser retain it.18 The website can indicate how long the web
browser should retain the cookie, and for which website or websites
the data in the cookie is intended.' 9 Then, each time the consumer
uses the web browser to visit the corresponding website or websites,
the consumer's web browser sends the content of the cookie back to
the website. 2 0 By assigning each web browser a cookie with a unique
number, a behavioral advertiser's website can later differentiate and
profile the activities of the many consumers using the website.2 1
Many businesses that use this form of behavioral advertising
take advantage of the services of "network advertisers."22 Network
advertisers are "companies that select and deliver advertisements
across the Internet at websites that participate in their networks."2 3
These ads are targeted using profiles that describe the consumer's
activities at all of the sites within the advertising network. 24 This
network can "include hundreds or thousands of different, unrelated
websites."25 Thus, the network advertiser can compile a rich profile
about the activities of consumers using each computer or device. 2 6
Network advertisers use cookies in a sophisticated way to track
consumer behavior. 27 First, they solicit websites to become part of
their advertising networks. 28 Then, when a consumer first visits a
website that is a member of an advertising network, the member
website sends a cookie with a unique tracking number to the web
browser. 29 This cookie is configured to be included with all requests
18. DINO ESPOSITO, PROGRAMMING MICROSOFT ASP.NET 2.0 538 (Microsoft Press
2006).
19. Msdn.microsoft.com, HTTP Cookies, http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/aa384321(VS.85).aspx (last visited May 10, 2009).
20. See id.
21. See, e.g., Katherine McKinley, Cleaning Up After Cookies Version 1.0, at 1, 2 (Dec.
31, 2008), https://www.isecpartners.com/files/iSECCleaningUpAfter Cookies.pdf (noting
that websites use browser-based plug-ins to store information used for "credentials
(username/passwords and equivalents), tracking users, storing preferences (interface
customizations, volume controls), site data (security questions, images, cached data), identifying
tokens, or other data").
22. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 2-3.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id at 3 n.5.
25. Id
26. Id at 2-3. Moreover, "an individual website may belong to multiple networks." Id. at
3 n.5.
27. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 2.
28. Id. at 2-3.
29. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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for content sent to any of the network advertiser's member websites.30
Thus, each time the consumer visits any of the member websites, the
network advertiser can associate the consumer with the web content
that the consumer accessed.3 1
Typically, some placeholder content element on the requested
web page from the member's website-typically a banner image or a
"box"-will direct the consumer's web browser to the network
advertiser's website.32 The consumer's web browser then dutifully
loads a targeted advertisement from the network advertiser's website
into the placeholder banner image or "box." 33 When the consumer's
web browser requests this content from the network advertiser's
website, the web browser includes the cookie containing the unique
tracking number as part of the request. 34 The request also contains
data indicating the webpage on the member's website that the user
had requested.35 This allows the network advertiser to track the
consumer's activities across multiple websites in the advertiser's
member network 36 and pay member websites when they supply
consumers to the network advertiser. This behavior is hidden from
the consumer; the consumer does not normally know anything about
the cookies, which websites are members of which advertisers'
networks, or what information a member website might share with the
network advertiser.
Generally, the data that behavioral advertisers collect is not
personally identifying because it does not include the consumer's
name, physical address, or other personal identifiers that could
translate directly to the "offline world."3 9 Unless a consumer discloses
her name or other personally identifying information to a website that
is a member of the behavioral advertiser's member network, the
behavioral advertiser only knows the consumer by a unique
30. Id.
31. FED. TRADE COMM'N, ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2-6 (2000)
[hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/06/onlineprofilingreportjune2000.pdf.
32. Id. at 3, n.1 (referring to beacons as "web bugs"); DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at
503.
33. See DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503 (referring to the "boxes" as "blank spaces").
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 503-505.
37. Google, AdSense, https://www.google.com/adsense/login/enUS/ (last visited Mar.
28, 2010).
38. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d. at 504.
39. Id. at 502.
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identifying number in the cookie.4 0 Even so, because a behavioral
advertiser's profile of a consumer becomes more detailed through the
accretion of data from many websites over time, the detail makes it
correspondingly easier to identify the profiled consumer.41
Because of their role in enabling this process, some consumers
have become critical of cookies, and their concerns have led
developers of web browsers to create features to aid consumers in
managing and blocking cookies. 4 2  Indeed, a consumer might
effectively opt out of all behavioral profiling if the consumer either
configured his web browser to refuse to accept cookies, or constantly
removed all cookies from the web browser's memory.4 3 A consumer's
antivirus software could also conceivably thwart behavioral
advertisers if it watched for and deleted cookies known to be
associated with a behavioral advertiser's web servers.4
Usually, however, because cookies are so critical to website
development, disabling or blocking them tends to cause errors and
can result in an unsatisfactory experience with many websites.45
40. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
41. Barbaro & Zeller, supra note 1.
42. See, e.g., Microsoft Support, The Default Privacy Settings for Internet Explorer 6,
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/293222/EN-US/ (last visited July 24, 2010) (noting the creation
of a new "Privacy tab" in Internet Explorer 6 to allow users to configure cookie settings);
Google Chrome, Cookies: Manage Cookies,
http://www.google.com/support/chrome/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-95647 (last visited July
24, 2010) (explaining how and why to use Google Chrome's cookie-blocking features);
Complaint at 15, Valentine v. NebuAd, No. CV 08 5113, (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2008), available
at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/califomia/candce/3:2008cv05113/208758/1/ ("As software programs that filtered online
activity and deleted browser cookies developed[,] . . . the consumer gained control over .
attempts at data collection.").
43. See ESPoslTO, supra note 18 ("The downside of cookies is ... the fact that the user
can disable them."); see also DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 504-05 (noting that a user may opt
out of DoubleClick's behavioral advertising regime by configuring their browser to block
cookies).
44. See Cristina Mailat, Tracking Cookies and How to Delete Them, IDSECURITYSUITE,
Dec. 18, 2007, http://www.idsecuritysuite.com/blog/tracking-cookies-and-how-to-delete-them.
45. See HTFP Cookies, supra note 19 (noting the usefulness of the cookies to website
developers). Google's new Chrome web browser takes a different approach with its "incognito"
mode: it accepts cookies, but deletes them at the end of the browsing session. Google Chrome,
Explore Google Chrome features: Incognito Mode,
http://www.google.com/support/chrome/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-95464 (last visited May
10, 2009). This approach may deliver a better user experience while still improving privacy
because the cookie mechanism still works, but any tracking cookies would be automatically
deleted at the end of the session. See id. But, Chrome itself may be criticized for sending too
much information to Google. Google Chrome, Google Chrome Privacy Notice,
http://www.google.com/chrome/intl/en/privacy.html (last visited May 10, 2009) (noting that
Chrome sends Google a list of visited website and queries).
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Indeed, website developers often must use cookies to identify a web
browser between requests for web pages because the hypertext
transfer protocol, which describes the rules computers follow when
they load web pages, is "stateless." 4 6 This means that if a website
developer wants to create a process that remembers the consumer's
identity across visits to multiple web pages (the procedure of adding
items to an online shopping cart is the paradigmatic example of this),
the website developer must use cookies (or some other means) to
distinguish the consumer from other consumers and remember the
context of that consumer's earlier visits. 47 In the shopping cart
example, for instance, the website must be able to identify the
consumer so that it can check its memory to see which items are in
the associated consumer's shopping cart and where the associated
consumer is in the checkout process.48
The two other methods that behavioral advertisers already
commonly use to track consumers on the Internet do not rely on
cookies.4 9 Both methods are relatively more subtle, unexpected, and
difficult for the consumer to detect or avoid.so
First, a consumer's ISP or a website the consumer visits can
install software directly to the consumer's computer to view data that
the computer exchanges with other computers on the Internet.5 '
Potentially, such a profiler could observe the consumer's entire
stream of Internet traffic-all data that the consumer's computer sends
or receives. 52 This software might fairly be characterized as
spyware. 3
Before installation, a consumer might know only that a website
he or she visited wanted to install software to his or her computer and
believe that the software was needed to display a desired website-
perhaps even the ISP's own website.54 Or, he or she might wish to
46. See ESPOSITO, supra note 18, at 538.
47. See Cookiecentral.com, Cookies and Privacy FAQ,
http://www.cookiecentral.com/n-cookie-faq.htm (last visited May 10, 2009).
48. See id
49. See infra Part I.A.
50. See infra Part L.A.
51. Chloe Albanesius, Should Your ISP be allowed to Serve You Spyware?, PC
MAGAZINE, Apr. 28, 2008,
http://www.pcmag.com/print article2/0,1217,a=226952,00.asp?hidPrint-true.
52. Id.
53. See id. The author of the article describes this software as spyware. This is probably
a fair characterization of what the software does, but producers of this software would
undoubtedly resist this characterization.
54. See id (noting that, according to the Anti-Spyware Coalition, ISPs may "partner with
11I2011]
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download the software to get some benefit the program offers without
knowing that the program also tracks Internet use.' 5 For instance,
Google's Chrome web browser, while probably not popularly
considered spyware, discloses to Google all of the searches and URLs
entered into the address bar.
Once installed, the software can operate transparently and, thus,
only the most vigilant consumers (perhaps equipped with anti-
spyware software) would learn that they were being tracked. 7 Even
then, it might be difficult for the consumer to know where the
tracking software originated, and it may be impossible to know which
profiler was doing the tracking or what information the profiler
obtained.58
On the other hand, the software could also be written to disclose
its existence, purpose, and activities to the computer user. 59 Some
consumers might be willing to allow a profiler access to this
information in exchange for a targeted service.
The final common method of behavioral advertising, deep packet
inspection (DPI), is even more subtle and difficult to detect, because
this method gives the consumer no indication that her activities are
being tracked.o Using this approach, the consumer's ISP (or a partner
company)6 1 installs powerful hardware devices 62 that examine all of
targeting companies in order to give access to a user's entire traffic stream with little or notice
and consent").
55. See Google Chrome, Google Chrome Privacy Notice,
http://www.google.com/chrome/intl/en/privacy.html (last visited May 10, 2009) (noting that
Chrome sends Google a list of visited website and queries).
56. Id. To be fair, Chrome has to supply Google with the text of searches so that Google
can perform the search and return the results to the consumer's web browser. Nevertheless,
Google has no similar functional need to know the address of every website a consumer visits.
57. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., ANTI-SPYWARE COALITION DEFINITIONS
DOCUMENT, WORKING REPORT, Nov. 12, 2007,
http://www.antispywarecoalition.org/documents/documents/2007definitions.pdf (last visited
April 6, 2009).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2.
60. See Complaint at 17, 21, Valentine v. NebuAd, No. CV 08 5113, (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10,
2008), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/califomia/candce/3:2008cv05113/208758/1/ (alleging that ISPs allowed NebuAd to "tap[]
directly into the consumer's ISP connection").
61. See id. at 17.
62. See What Your Broadband Provider Knows About Your Web Use: Deep Packet
Inspection and Communications Laws and Policies Before the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, Subcomm. on Telecommunications and the Internet, 110,b Cong. 2 (2008)
[hereinafter Statement] (statement of Alissa Cooper, Chief Computer Scientist, Center for
Democracy & Technology), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/Hearings/PDF/Testimony/TI/l 10-
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the Internet traffic going to or originating from consumers'
computers. While there could be a variety of uses for this data, one
possible use is to compile information of interest to marketers.64
Indeed, an ISP could sell this information to marketers to create
additional revenue.65 The DPI method does not require any software
to be installed on the consumer's computer, nor would an anti-
spyware program be able to easily detect it.6 6
Further, this method of profiling is practically impossible to stop
or avoid.6  While consumers can remove tracking cookies and
spyware from their computers to protect their privacy from the
previously described methods of tracking, there is little that they can
do to protect themselves from DPI-based profiling.68 The only
limiting factor is that the required network hardware would need to be
within the ISP's traffic "stream," so this method would require the
cooperation of the ISP.69 The Washington Post estimates that "at least
100,000 U.S. customers are tracked this way," and that ISPs "have
ti-hrg.071708.Cooper-testimony.pdf (noting the computational power to perform this kind of
inspection has only recently become available). Ordinarily, internet routers examine only the
headers of packets of data. This header information is analogous to the address information on
an envelope of postal mail. This necessary practice is known as shallow packet inspection.
During shallow packet inspection, the router needs only to examine a small portion of the data
and only for the purpose of deciding where to send the data. By comparison, deep packet
inspection devices are capable of not only reading the information on the outside of the envelope
but the letter inside during the course of delivery. Id. at 2, 4-6.
63. Peter Whoriskey, Every Click You Make: Internet Providers Quietly Test Expanded
Tracking of Web Use to Target Advertising, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/03/AR200804 0 3 0 4 05 2 .html.
By contrast, with the conventional cookie-based approach, the behavioral marketer can learn
only whatever a user communicates to websites that are part of the marketer's network of
websites. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 16, n.40. However, at present, deep packet inspection
cannot inspect encrypted packets, which are commonly exchanged when a user supplies
sensitive financial data like credit card numbers. Statement, supra note 62, at 5.
64. Whoriskey, supra note 63.
65. Id
66. Id
67. See Complaint at 15, 22, Valentine v. NebuAd, No. CV 08 5113, (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10,
2008), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/califomia/candce/3:2008cv05113/208758/1/ (noting that consumers used a variety of
methods to control profilers' data collection efforts); Statement, supra note 62, at 3 (noting that
"existing opt-outs merely discontinue the creation of behavior profiles" rather than terminating
the inspection of the consumer's internet traffic); id. at 12-13 (noting that only the "most
sophisticated and technically savvy consumers are likely to be able to successfully negotiate
such opt-out processes").
68. See Statement, supra note 62, at 15 (alleging that consumers used these methods to
control the disclosure of their information).
69. Id. at 6.
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been testing it with as many as 10 percent of U.S. customers." 70 As
with the other approaches, it may be impossible-or at least very
difficult-to know what information a marketer collects using this
method. 7 1 And, while some DPI providers may have a mechanism for
allowing users who are aware of the DPI to opt out of the profiling,
this opt-out may stop only the storage of consumer information, rather
than the DPI itself.72 Some ISPs, perhaps fearing a negative customer
reaction, are expressly and publicly disavowing any use of this
technology within their own networks, and indicating their belief that
this kind of profiling should only take place with the customer's
consent.73
The data that a profiler gleans using either of these two latter
methods could be used to select and display an appropriate
advertisement.7 4 If, however, the profiler also possesses the necessary
names, addresses, e-mail addresses, or telephone numbers, the profiler
may be able to combine the data for direct mail and e-mail marketing
campaigns, telephone marketing, or any other form of behavioral
advertising. Since ISPs and some other service providers must retain
consumers' information for billing purposes, the potential for
combining a consumer's behavioral profile with billing information is
a concern, particularly since the consumer likely expects billing
76information to be used solely for billing purposes.
Indeed, all of the foregoing forms of behavioral targeting are
invisible to the consumer77  unless the profiler discloses the
profiling.78 Profilers may even be taking advantage of their obscurity
70. Whoriskey, supra note 63.
71. See Complaint at 17-18, Valentine v. NebuAd, No. CV 08 5113, (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10,
2008), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/califomia/candce/3:2008cv05113/208758/1/ (noting that NebuAd, in its patent
application claimed that its deep packet inspection device would be transparent to the user).
72. Statement, supra note 62, at 3.
73. See Roy Mark, Broadband Providers Vow to Protect User Privacy, EWEEK.COM,
Sep. 26, 2008, available at http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Enterprise-Applications/Broadband-
Providers-Vow-to-Protect-User-Privacy/.
74. Statement, supra note 62, at 6-7.
75. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 22 ("[D]epending on the way information is
collected and stored, it may be possible to link or merge non-PII with PII. For example, a
website might collect anonymous tracking data and then link that data with PH (e.g., name,
address) that the consumer provided when registering at the site.").
76. See id.
77. Hotaling, supra note 13, at 548, 558.
78. A recent article in the New York Times alluded to consumers' hopelessness when it
comes to truly understanding the privacy implications of their actions:
Enter the post-privacy society, where we have lost track of how many entities are
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to sidestep the negative consumer sentiment that would result if
consumers had to be explicitly told when profilers were collecting
information about them and their Internet activities.79
Profilers certainly benefit from their obscurity when it comes to
avoiding liability for inappropriate disclosure. Even if a consumer
suspected that the contents of his profile had been inappropriately
used or disclosed, it would be difficult for him to discern which
profiler was at fault, and, therefore, which company to contact or,
perhaps, to sue.80 Because consumers lack this information, they may
be without effective legal recourse when a profiler's use of behavioral
targeting harms them."
Perversely, this situation also leaves profilers with little incentive
to improve their privacy protections.82 Presumably, because
consumers lack the basic information they would need to hold
profilers accountable when they improperly disclose consumer data,
consumers and consumers' agents (like banks that provide protections
from identity theft and financial fraud) are left to bear the costs of the
improper disclosure. 83 Thus, the transparency of behavioral targeting
creates a formidable information gap between consumers on one hand
and profilers on the other. This gap is a significant obstacle to
assessing the prevalence of these risks and to holding profilers
accountable when misuse occurs.
The final method of profiling is far more explicit to consumers.
This method, which the FTC refers to as "first party" targeting,
"involves targeting based on data collected at and by a single
website." 84 The FTC views this method of profiling as relatively
tracking us. Not to mention what they are doing with our personal information,
how they are storing it, whom they might be selling our dossiers to and, yes, how
much money they are making from them. On the way out, consumer advocates
say, is that quaint old notion of informed consent, in which a company clearly
notifies you of its policies and gives you the choice of whether to opt in (rather
than having you opt out once you discover your behavior is being tracked). "How
does notice and choice work when you don't even interface with the company
that has your data?" says Jessica Rich, a deputy director of the bureau of
consumer protection at the Federal Trade Commission.
Natasha Singer, Shoppers Who Can't Have Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2010, at BU5,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/business/02stream.html.
79. Hotaling, supra note 13, at 559. It is indeed ironic that consumers have so little
privacy from profilers, but profilers have almost complete privacy from consumers!
80. Id
81. Id
82. Id
83. See id.
84. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 26.
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innocuous because it is "more likely to be consistent with consumer
expectations, and less likely to lead to consumer harm" when
compared to profiling "involving the sharing of data with third parties
or across multiple websites:" 8 1
[G]iven the direct relationship between the consumer and the
website, the consumer is likely to understand why he has received
the targeted recommendation or advertisement and indeed may
expect it. The direct relationship also puts the consumer in a better
position to raise any concerns he has about the collection and use
of his data, exercise any choices offered by the website, or avoid
the practice altogether by taking his business elsewhere. By
contrast, when behavioral advertising involves the sharing of data
with ad networks or other third parties, the consumer may not
understand why he has received ads from unknown marketers
based on his activities at an assortment of previously visited
websites. Moreover, he may not know whom to contact to register
his concerns or how to avoid the practice.86
The FTC concluded that "first party" targeting did not pose as
much risk "that the data will fall into the wrong hands" compared to
the other methods of profiling, and that, therefore, its self-regulatory
principles would not apply to first party targeting.87
For instance, Netflix, an Internet-based movie rental service,
aggregates information about consumers' preferences to suggest
movies that subscribers are likely to enjoy.88 Since Netflix uses this
information to target suggestions to existing subscribers,89 it is not
advertising in the traditional sense, even though Netflix uses this
capability to encourage a service subscriber to maintain or increase
the subscriber's use of the service. 90 Similarly, Facebook collects
biographical information from each subscriber to suggest people the
subscriber might know because they have mutual friends, because
they worked in the same place, or because they attended the same
school. 91
85. Id.
86. Id. at 27.
87. Id. at 27.
88. Clive Thompson, If You Liked This, You're Sure to Love That, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 23,
2008, (Magazine), at MM74, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/magazine/23Netflix-t.html.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. Florin Ratiu, People You May Know, The Facebook Blog, FACEBOOK,
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post-15610312130. Of course, Facebook also is known for
using customers' profiles for targeted advertisements as well. Facebook, Facebook Advertising,
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Services like Netflix and Facebook are exciting and useful
because they aggregate information about consumers to deliver a
valuable product that would not be possible otherwise. 92 Indeed,
while behavioral advertising is sometimes used as a synonym for
behavioral targeting, 9 3 behavioral advertising should be understood as
the use of behavioral targeting for advertising purposes. 94 Some
applications of behavioral targeting, like the services offered by
Netflix and Facebook, have only a strained connection to advertising
in the traditional sense. These applications of behavioral targeting
enable Internet businesses to deliver services that simply would not
have been possible without the use of consumer profiles. Nonetheless,
these technologies still must collect data about consumers to be
effective, 95 and therefore present the same privacy concerns as are
inherent in any behavioral targeting endeavor.
B. The Risks ofBehavioral Targeting
Consumer and privacy advocates are concerned that the
compilation of extensive profiles containing information about
consumers and their behavior can harm consumers.96 This subsection
explains how behavioral targeting can harm consumers and the
circumstances when these harms can occur. It also explains how
consumers are in a poor position to effectively manage the risks
associated with profiling. Finally, it discusses profilers' attempts to
manage these risks through anonymization.
1. How Behavioral Targeting Harms Consumers
Behavioral targeting is not a new phenomenon, nor does it occur
solely on the Internet. Indeed, in 1999, the FTC became interested in
http://www.facebook.com/advertising/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2010); Duncan Riley, Facebook
Will Use Profiles to Target Ads, Predict Future, TECHCRUNCH, Aug. 22, 2007,
http://techcrunch.com/2007/08/22/facebook-will-use-profiles-to-target-ads-predict-future/;
Vauhini Vara, Facebook Gets Personal With Ad Targeting Plan, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2007, at
BI, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 118783296519606151.html?mod-rss whats news technology.
92. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID
ECoNOMY 122-141 (2008).
93. See, e.g., Letter from Privacy Advocates to Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, at 6 [hereinafter Privacy Letter], available at
http://www.cdt.org/privacy/20071031 consumerprotectionsbehavioral.pdf.
94. See infra Part III (observing that the FTC makes a similar distinction in the scope of
its new self-regulatory principles).
95. See id.
96. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at i-ii.
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the risks associated with behavioral targeting when DoubleClick, a
company specializing in Internet-based behavioral advertising,
purchased Abacus Direct, a direct marketing services corporation
maintaining information on American customers' "offline" retail
habits. 9 7 The FTC worried that DoubleClick would be able to
combine its Internet consumer database with the purchased Abacus
database describing consumer's "offline" habits98  and that the
combination would sharply increase the detail with which the merged
organization would be able to view the consumers it had profiled. 99
After investigating, the FTC concluded that its fears were
unfounded because DoubleClick had not combined its Internet-based
database with Abacus' "offline" database.'00  Nevertheless, the
proliferation of behavioral targeting makes it likely that Internet
profiling will become so much more extensive and thorough that
Internet profiles will grow to contain as much detail as a combined
DoubleClick database would have, even though the Internet profile is
never merged with a source of "offline" information.
Nevertheless, as this part shows, the existence of these consumer
profiles, replete with information about the consumer and his or her
habits, puts all consumers in danger of (1) losing the ability to shield
intimate and personal details of their private lives from the view of
profilers who wish to use this data as a marketing tool, (2)
embarrassment from the unexpected disclosure of details about a
consumer that a consumer expected to remain private, (3) identity
theft or other forms of financial fraud made possible by the richness
of detailed information present in a consumer's profile, and even (4)
the unexpected use of a consumer's profile to make adverse decisions
about how to treat her.
First, consumer and privacy advocates criticize behavioral
targeting because it results in the compilation of a sizable array of
potentially sensitive data about the consumer that exists outside her
ability to protect, control, or monitor.1o' Indeed, profiling arguably
97. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 505.
98. Id.
99. See id. (noting that the combination could "create a super-database capable of
matching [consumers'] online activities with their names and addresses"); see also Complaint
and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief at 6-10, In the Matter
of DoubleClick, before the Fed. Trade Comm'n (Feb. 10, 2000), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/internet/fic/DCLK complaint.pdf (noting that a combined database
would violate consumers' expectations of privacy and alleging that it constitutes an unfair
practice under the FTC Act).
100. In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 506.
101. Cf Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal
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harms consumers regardless of how it is used because it results in an
unprecedented loss of privacy. By merely participating in the Internet
economy, consumers lose control over which details about their
private lives are known,102 and they have little control over who gets
to learn of these details after the data passes into a profiler's hands.10 3
Nor do consumers have any control over the way a profiler mines
compiled data to construct a "picture" of an individual consumer,
even though this data mining can generate a far more intrusive
"picture" of the consumer's life than he might expect.104 In creating
this picture, the profiler learns and potentially communicates
something private about the consumer that he has not authorized the
profiler to know.10 5
Secondly, sometimes this unauthorized picture can be
embarrassing, regardless of whether it is disclosed inadvertently or
intentionally. 06 This embarrassment is itself a type of harm that the
law has been willing to remedy in other contexts. 107
Even worse, in the wrong hands, a consumer's profile could
facilitate financial fraud or identity theft. 0 8 Thus, a consumer whose
Identifying Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SC. &
TECH. 91, 93 (2009) (discussing how consumers lose control over personally identifying
information (PI) when they disclose it to businesses, and how businesses use PH for data
mining).
102. Id. at 93; see also id. at 111 (discussing the embarrassment inherent in a physician
permitting an "unmarried man with no medical training to be present when a woman gave
birth").
103. Id. at 93.
104. Id. at 95-96.
105. See id. Some behavior advertisers do not believe that consumers should have a right
of privacy in these details. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 31 ("These commenters suggested
that consumers do not own the data that websites collect about them, and that there is no
precedent for giving consumers the ability to dictate the terms upon which they use a website.").
See also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193,
199 (1890), available at
http://groups.csail.mit.edulmac/classes/6.805/articles/privacy/Privacybrand-warr2.html ("[T]he
individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be given to the public. No other
has the right to publish his productions in any form, without his consent.") (emphasis added).
106. See Barbaro & Zeller, supra note 1.
107. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 105, at 197. ("[M]odem enterprise and invention
have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater
than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury."). Warren and Brandeis, however, premised their
influential ideas about privacy on the problem of gossipy newspapers. JOHN L. DIAMOND, ET.
AL, UNDERSTANDING TORTS 387, n.2 (3rd. ed. 2007). Because the social value of gossip is low,
it was comparatively easy for courts to follow the Warren and Brandeis article into recognizing
a right to privacy. However, with behavioral targeting's comparatively substantial benefits to
consumers and society, it is more difficult to make a plausible case that consumers have an
absolute right to privacy or complete control of their data. See infra part II.C.
108. See Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 101, at 101-02 (describing the risks of identity
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data is inappropriately disclosed might experience harm because she
must take steps to prevent, monitor, or remedy identity theft or other
financial fraud.1 09
Finally, consumer and privacy advocates also fear that the use of
behavioral profiles to make decisions that may be inappropriate (or at
least surprising) uses of consumer data. 110 For instance, insurers or
potential creditors might wish to use a consumer's profile in an
attempt to establish pricing for their products."' In addition, Internet
retailers may use consumer data to engage in a practice of differential
pricing for consumers based on a behavioral profile.1 12
2. The Mechanisms of Inappropriate Disclosure
When a profile paints an intrusive picture of a consumer, the
collection of the profile itself may harm the consumer regardless of
how the profile is used. But some other harms that consumer and
privacy advocates anticipate are contingent on the inappropriate use
theft and financial fraud inherent with the disclosure of personally identifying information
(P1I)). While the profiles that result from behavioral targeting may not contain PII, the
aggregation of even non-personally identifying information ultimately forms such a complete
picture of a consumer as to pose the same risks. See Barbaro & Zeller, supra note 1.
109. E.g., Sandy Kleffman, Kaiser Warns Nearly 30,000 Employees of Data Breach, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 6, 2009,
http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_11646163?nclickcheck=l (last visited Apr. 19, 2009)
(describing how a Kaiser Permanente data breach is believed to have resulted in identity theft
for several Kaiser Permanente employees whose data was described in the data lost in the
breach). See also Federal Trade Commission, Defend: Recover From Identity Theft, Fighting
Back Against Identity Theft,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/consumers/defend.html (last visited Apr. 19,
2009) (describing the many steps an identity theft must go through to minimize the effects of the
crime). But see Sasha Romanosky, et al., Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity
Theft?, Seventh Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, June 25-28, 2008,
http://weis2008.econinfosec.org/papers/Romanosky.pdf (" The probability of becoming a victim
to identity theft as a result of a data breach is very low, around only 2%."). Even if true, this
observation confirms that there is a measurable positive correlation between identity theft and
data breach. Nevertheless, it can be difficult to confirm whether incidents of identity theft are
attributable to a particular data breach. See Randy Ludlow & Holly Zacariah, Hacked Off Data
Thefts Leave Ohio University Scrambling, Students and Alumni Steaming, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Jun. 19, 2006, at 1 A (noting that although officials were not aware of any confirmed
cases of identity theft related to a data breach, 24 cases of identity theft were under
investigation).
110. Center for Democracy and Technology, Privacy Impact, Guide to Behavioral
Advertising, Oct. 27, 2009, http://www.cdt.org/content/privacy-impact (last visited Mar. 28,
2010) [hereinafter Privacy Impact].
Ill. Id. ("Behavioral profiles, particularly those that can be tied to an identifiable
individual, may also be a tempting source of information for companies making decisions about
people's credit, insurance or employment.").
112. Id.
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or disclosure of consumer data. Understanding how inappropriate use
or disclosure occurs, therefore, is a predicate to discussing the
appropriate legislative or regulatory methods of preventing these
harms.
First, ample anecdotal evidence shows that corporations and
other consumer information profilers have difficulty securing their
data.113 There are a variety of overlapping threats. Corporations
occasionally lose and misplace backup tapes 1 l4 and other archival
media." They lose data when laptops (and, increasingly, also mobile
devices like Blackberries' 16) containing sensitive data are lost or
stolen.117 Corporations occasionally lose data because hackers or
malware penetrate their electronic defenses.' 18 Sometimes they lose
113. See generally Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 101, at 97-101.
114. E.g., Jon Oltsik, Perspective: One Less Data Breach Method to Fret About, CNET
NEWS, Feb. 7, 2006, http://news.cnet.com/One-less-data-breach-method-to-fret-about/2010-
1029_3-6035850.html (last visited April 13, 2009) (describing data breaches at Bank of
America, Citibank, Marriott, and Time Warner); Ingrid Marson, Marriott Loses Data on
200,000 Customers, CNET NEWS, Jan. 3, 2006, http://news.cnet.com/Marriott-loses-data-on-
200,000-customers/2100-1029 3-6015768.html (describing data breach at Marriott); Dawn
Kawamoto, Data for 600,000 Time Warner Employees MIA, CNET NEWS, May 2, 2005,
http://news.cnet.com/Data-for-600,000-Time-Warner-employees-MIA/2100-1029_3-
5692534.html (describing loss of Time Warner backup tapes during transport to storage
facility).
115. E.g., Leo King, Virgin Media Loses Unencrypted CD With 3,000 Customer Bank
Details, COMPUTERWORLD UK, June 23, 2008,
http://www.computerworlduk.com/management/security/data-
control/news/index.cfm?newsid=9687 (describing how Virgin Media lost a CD containing
unencrypted customer banking details in spite of a company policy prohibiting this data from
being transmitted without encryption).
116. E.g., Cabinet Data on Stolen BlackBerry, BBC NEWS, Apr. 11, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/7994850.stm (last visited Apr. 13, 2009), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/7994850.stm; Yuki Noguchi, Lost a BlackBerry? Data
Could Open A Security Breach, WASH. POST, Jul. 25, 2005, at A01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/24/AR2005072401135.html.
117. E.g., Robert McMillan , Boeing Laptop Theft Puts U.S. Data Breach Tally Over
100M; A Privacy Group Has Kept Tabs on Incidents Since February 2005, COMPUTERWORLD,
Dec. 15, 2006,
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleld=90061
40 (discussing data breaches associated with lost laptops at Boeing); Nathan McFeters, Stanford
University Data Breach Leaks Sensitive Information ofApproximately 62,000 Employees, ZERO
DAY, June 23, 2008, http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1326.
118. E.g., Joel Hruska, Malware Infestation Responsible for Credit Card Data Breach,
ARS TECHNICA, Jan. 20, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/security/news/2009/01/malware-
infestation-responsible-for-credit-card-data-breach.ars (describing a credit card data breach at a
major processing company stemming from a malware infection and indicating the company
does not plan to provide credit monitoring to affected persons because the company concluded
the data breach did not pose this risk to consumers); Kim Zetter, Card Processor Admits to
Large Data Breach, WIRED.COM, Jan. 20, 2009,
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2009/01/card-processor.html (describing the same data breach
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data to disgruntled employees.11 9 Other times, data is lost because of
bugs in Internet-enabled software. 120 This loss happens in spite of
laws requiring these profilers to undergo expensive notification
campaigns when they have such disclosure.12 1 Some of these breaches
might be a result of a profiler's negligent safeguards, but, in other
cases, profilers are victims of others' malfeasance in spite of
instituting safeguards. Moreover, everyone must wonder how many
data losses go undetected and unreported. 122
In addition to losing data describing their customers, profilers
often share the data they collect about consumers. Companies
commonly share a customer's information across their business units,
and, of course, with contractors the company employs to provide its
products or services. 123  Some companies sell valuable data to
as the result of hacking); Brian Krebs, Justice Breyer Is Among Victims in Data Breach Caused
by File Sharing, WASH. POST, July 9, 2008, at AOl (describing data breaches resulting from
employee use of peer-to-peer file sharing programs). The distinction between malware and
hacking is, perhaps, misleading. Hackers often use malware as the instrumentality of their fraud.
See Zetter, supra note 118. Data breaches are not unique to corporations. "Higher education is a
juicy target [for hackers] because it compiles so much personal information in so many places."
Ludlow and Zacariab, supra note 109.
119. E.g., Brian Krebs, Data Breaches Up Almost 50 Percent, Affecting Records of 35.7
Million People, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2009, at D02 (noting "the percentage of breaches attributed
to data theft from current and former employees more than doubled from 7 percent in 2007 to
nearly 16 percent in 2008.").
120. Jason Kincaid, Google Privacy Blunder Shares Your Docs Without Permission,
TECHCRUNCH, Mar. 7, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/03/07/huge-google-privacy-
blunder-shares-your-docs-without-permission/ (describing a problem in Google Does that
inadvertently allowed former collaborators to access documents the owner had revoked access
to); Jenna Wortham, Facebook Glitch Brings New Privacy Worries, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010,
at B l. This sort of problem can be expected to become even more common as rapidly developed
software becomes more common. This software development approach speeds the release of
new features to users, but at the "cost" of rigorous testing. Or, perhaps a better way to put it is
that the earliest users perform the testing that software testers might have done.
121. E.g., Brian Krebs, Data Breaches Are More Costly Than Ever, WASH. POST, Feb. 3,
2009, at D03 (according to a new study, "[o]rganizations that experienced a data breach in 2008
paid an average of $6.6 million last year to rebuild their brand image and retain customers ...
."); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.82, and 1798.84 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-
716 (2008); Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 101, at 10 1-02. Note that, while data breach laws
are common, most do not require the breached entity to do anything more than notify consumers
of the breach. Id. at 102.
122. See, e.g., Thomas Clabum, Most Security Breaches Go Unreported, INFORMATION
WEEK, Aug. 1, 2008,
http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/attacks/showArticlejhtml?articlelD=20990120
8 (noting that according to one survey, "[m]ore than 89% of security incidents went unreported
in 2007.").
123. DANIEL SOLOVE ET AL., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 623 (2d ed. 2006); Corey A.
Ciocchetti, The Future of Privacy Policies: A Privacy Nutrition Label Filled With Fair
Information Practices, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 29-30 (2008).
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"partners" that use the data for marketing purposes not connected to
the original company's business units.124
Profilers may also be required to share the data they collect with
law enforcement authorities and litigants. 125 Indeed, a person's right
to privacy relative to government agents in this context is much
weaker than consumers probably expect. 126 An individual's right to
privacy in any information that a third party holds is extremely
limited. 127  Many profilers include warnings in their privacy
statements that a consumer's profile may have to be disclosed to law
enforcement authorities. 12 1 And, this data may occasionally be at risk
because it could be discoverable in civil litigation. 12 9
3. The Role of the Consumer
Consumers are in poor positions to protect themselves from
these harms. They lack the information that they need to make
rational decisions about whether to participate in activities on the
Internet that involve behavioral targeting.
The fundamental calculus of risk aversion is a familiar tort
124. SOLOVE, supra note 123, at 623; Ciocchetti, supra note 123, at 18.
125. See infra notes 128-131.
126. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976) (concluding a person has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his bank's imaged check records, even though that
consumer gives data to the bank for a limited purpose, because when a person gives information
to a third party, the person takes the risk that the third party will disclose the data to the
government); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (concluding a person has no
expectation of privacy in trash placed for collection outside the home, even though it may reveal
intimate details of the private behavior going on inside the house, because when left in public,
the trash is accessible to animals, children, and others). When a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in a certain piece of information, the legal result is that govemment
agents need neither a warrant nor probable cause to obtain the information. See Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (confirming that Fourth Amendment protections can attach
only when a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy). See generally Sprague &
Ciocchetti, supra note 101, at 114-16.
127. Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 101, at 116 (surveying cases and concluding that
individuals have no right to privacy in the "'to/from addresses of e-mail messages, the IP
addresses of websites visited and the total amount of data transmitted to or from an account'" or
"'subscriber information provided to an internet provider"'); United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d
1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008).
128. E.g., Facebook, Privacy Policy, http://www.facebook.com/policy.phpref--pf (last
visited Apr. 19, 2009) ("We may disclose information pursuant to subpoenas, court orders, or
other requests (including criminal and civil matters) if we have a good faith belief that the
response is required by law."); Netflix, Privacy Policy, http://www.netflix.com/PrivacyPolicy
(last visited Apr. 19, 2009) ("Netflix also reserves the right to disclose personal information
when we reasonably believe disclosure is required by law, if we reasonably believe disclosure is
necessary to establish or exercise legal rights, or in situations involving potential threats to
physical safety.").
129. Privacy Impact, supra note 110.
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concept to most lawyers. As Judge Learned Hand wrote:
The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the
resultant of three factors: the likelihood that his conduct will injure
others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and
balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the
risk. 130
Judge Hand later expressed this analysis in a formula:
[I]f the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e.
whether B < PL.
In short, under Judge Hand's intuitive analysis, a person is
negligent in taking precautions to avoid a particular harm when the
person refuses to incur a precautionary cost or burden that is less than
the magnitude of the loss multiplied by the probability of the loss. 132
Judge Hand's calculation is readily adaptable to the analysis that
consumers must perform in deciding whether to assume the risks
inherent in taking part in an activity on the Internet involving
behavioral targeting. Under Judge Hand's formula, a consumer should
be willing to participate in an activity involving behavioral targeting
as long as the value the consumer gets from participation exceeds the
risk of loss. The risk of loss, just as in the classic tort law analysis, is
equal to the probability of loss multiplied by the expected magnitude
of the loss.
Consumers are not able to readily determine the risk of loss
inherent in participating in activities involving behavioral targeting
because they lack accurate information about the probability of the
loss and the magnitude of the harm that could occur. Thus, consumers
are in a poor position to decide when and how to protect themselves
from the harms inherent in behavioral targeting. Indeed, as the
foregoing examples have shown, consumers cannot assess the
potential magnitude of harm because they likely do not know when
profilers are collecting and using their data. Consumers also lack
information about what data the profilers collect or guess about them.
In addition, consumers are unable to assess the probability of harm
occurring because they do not know how profilers use their
behavioral profile or the prevalence of inappropriate use or
130. Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940).
131. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
132. See id; See also JOHN L. DIAMOND, ET. AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 69 (2d ed.
2000).
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disclosure. 13
The consumer's inability to accurately assess the magnitude of
loss begins with her inadequate understanding of how much data the
profilers can obtain and how the data describes even some of the most
intimate details about the consumer.' 34 Consumer and privacy
advocates analogize the non-consensual use of an Internet user's
information to a wiretap of a telephone call. 135 They suggest that
consumers would rightly be upset if someone listened to their phone
conversations without consent, regardless of the purpose of the
eavesdropping or the steps used to safeguard the record of the
information learned from the eavesdropping.136 Consumers do not
expect their phone calls to be intercepted nor for revealed personal
details to be cataloged. 137
Likewise, consumers do not expect their ISPs to listen in on their
web-based "conversations." On the contrary, consumers expect their
ISPs to serve merely as a conduit for their information.'38 Similarly,
when a consumer visits a website, he expects to receive information
and may not expect to be tracked and profiled. Consumer advocates
fear that as Internet users begin to understand the extent of the
profiling that online marketers perform, they will begin to avoid using
the Internet in spite of its efficiency and convenience.1 39
These breaches of consumer expectation may be especially
worrisome when profilers collect sensitive elements of personal
information that have a heightened potential for abuse. For instance,
the FTC notes that financial and health information are especially
sensitive.140 Financial details are rife with the potential for financial
fraud.141 Health information could easily become an embarrassment,
133. Privacy Impact, supra note 110. See also Letter from Alan Davidson, Senior Policy
Counsel and Head of U.S. Public Policy, Google Inc. to Jessica Rich, Federal Trade
Commission (Apr. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/behavioraladprinciples/080404google.pdf [hereinafter Google
Letter] (explaining that Google is concerned with building trust with users through
"transparency" in behavioral advertising, and, in particular, "being upfront with our users about
what information we collect and how we use it").
134. Privacy Impact, supra note 110.
135. See Statement, supra note 62, at 16, 21-29.
136. See id. at 15-16.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1.
139. Id. at 8.
140. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 42; see also Chloe Albanesius, Should Online Ads Be
Allowed to Know If You Have AIDS?, PC MAGAZINE, Apr. 11, 2008,
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2283076,00.asp.
141. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 42-44.
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an unwelcome intrusion on a consumer's privacy, and might, in an
extreme case, even hamper the consumer's ability to get employment
or insurance. 142 Privacy advocates are also understandably concerned
about the profiling of children, because they may not understand the
privacy concerns as an adult might, nor are they capable of legally
assenting to a service provider's privacy policy or terms of use. 143 A
consumer's physical location is also sensitive because of its
significance in allowing the consumer to be personally identified.144
Consumers are also likely to be surprised that profilers use
mathematical models to "guess" the characteristics of a consumer.145
Statistical techniques make it possible that a consumer's profile might
not only include factual information about a consumer's Internet use,
but also inferred information, which may or may not be correct. 146
Because profilers potentially have access to information about the
habits, likes, and propensities of many consumers, they may "guess"
or "predict" unknown information about consumers through a
statistical process of comparing them to other consumers with known
information. 147 In a sense, this process is exactly what Amazon or
Netflix does when generating suggestions for books, movies, or other
items: they suggest to consumers other items that similar consumers
(meaning, in this sense, consumers with similar preferences or
purchases) liked. But, now, instead of guessing a consumer's
preference for a good or service, the profiler guesses information
about the consumer. 148
142. See Privacy Impact, supra note 110.
143. See id.; JEFFREY FERRIELL & MICHAEL NAVIN, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS, 509-
10 (2004) (noting that, in contract law, children are not capable of "adequately protecting their
own interests."). Congress was also concerned, and it expressed that concern when it passed the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA"). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2000).
COPPA defines a child as a person under 13, leaving children over the age of 13 without
enhanced privacy protection. 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2000).
144. Privacy Impact, supra note 110. The CDT's statement also indicates that the laws that
protect health information within the health care sector might not apply outside this context. Id.
145. See CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY ET AL., ONLINE BEHAVIORAL TRACKING AND
TARGETING, LEGISLATIVE PRIMER 3 (2009),
http://www.uspirg.org/uploads/s6/9h/s69h7ytWnmbOJE-V2uGd4w/Online-Privacy---
Legislative-Primer.pdf [hereinafter PRIMER]; REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 5-6.
146. See JIAN HU ET AL., DEMOGRAPHIC PREDICTION BASED ON USER'S BROWSING
BEHAVIOR 151 (2007), http://www2007.org/papers/paper686.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2011)
(proposing a method for predicting basic demographic information of consumers on the
internet).
147. See id. While it is not known how prevalent these inferential techniques are today, the
existence of the research attests to the value of making guesses about key demographic
characteristics of consumers that enable improved ad targeting.
148. HU, supra note 146, at 1; REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 4-6.
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Because consumers lack marketers' sophisticated understanding
of the models that can be used to predict a consumer's demographic
information, their intuitive assessment of the magnitude of the harm
of participating in an Internet activity involving behavioral targeting
is likely to be too low. If inferred demographic characteristics are
stored along with other elements in a consumer's profile as factual
information, and then inappropriately disclosed, even inadvertently, it
could make the magnitude of embarrassment even worse. Even when
the inferred information is accurate, it allows profilers to create an
even more comprehensive profile of a consumer that contains
information the consumer did not even know he or she was
disclosing. 149
For instance, researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, after analyzing over 4,000 students' Facebook profiles,
were recently "able to predict, with 78 percent accuracy, whether a
profile belonged to a gay male."15 0 The inference about a person's
sexuality, if it is unexpectedly or inappropriately disclosed, could be
deeply intrusive, embarrassing, and harmful for consumers, regardless
of whether the inference is correct.
Thus, because consumers lack information about what
information profilers collect (or guess) and how sensitive the
information is, consumers are likely to underestimate the magnitude
of harm that can occur because of their participation in activities that
involve behavioral targeting. However, consumers have even less
information to aid them in understanding the likelihood that harm will
occur.
For instance, in May 2010, Facebook "users discovered a glitch
that gave them access to supposedly private information in the
accounts of their Facebook friends, like chat conversations."' This
presents consumers with the difficult question of trying to assess the
likelihood that a company like Facebook will disclose their personal
data in a way that can harm them. As an industry analyst noted,
"[Facebook users] have to ask whether it is a platform worthy of their
trust."l 5 2 And a recent complaint against Facebook in the FTC even
charged that Facebook also intentionally "manipulate[s] the privacy
settings of users and its own privacy policy so that it can take
149. See PRIMER, supra note 145, at 3.
150. Steve Lohr, How Privacy Vanishes Online, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at Al.
151. Jenna Wortham, Facebook Glitch Brings New Privacy Worries, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
2010, at Bl.
152. Id.
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personal information provided by users for a limited purpose and
make it widely available for commercial purposes."15 3 Facebook users
are especially indignant about the inadvertent disclosure because
"most people signed up for Facebook with the understanding that
their information would be available only to an approved circle of
friends."l 5 4
The Facebook example is simply an unusually public example of
an inadvertent data breach. As part I.B.2 described, there is ample
anecdotal evidence showing that data breaches happen continually
under a variety of circumstances. The typical consumer simply has no
way of intelligently assessing the thoroughness of the precautions that
a profiler takes to protect the consumer's data. Consequently, the
consumer simply cannot assess the probability that a profiler's use of
behavioral targeting will harm them.
4. Mitigation Through Anonymization
Profilers have attempted to mitigate some risks of harm to
consumers through anonymization. "5 Anonymization is an effort to
take a set of data, such as a database containing consumer profiles,
and eliminate those characteristics of the set that would allow
someone to discern the identities of the consumers described in the
dataset.156  Behavioral advertisers, during public hearings and
proceedings before the FTC, expressed their belief that information
that does not identify a consumer's identity poses no significant risk
to the consumer's privacy.'5 7 Other behavioral advertisers have touted
their efforts to anonymize their data by severing the direct ties
between a consumer's profile and the consumer's identity.15' Indeed,
behavioral advertisers often have little need to know the identity of a
consumer to effectively profile and advertise to that consumer.1 59 Of
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Google Letter, supra note 133, at 8; Complaint at 24, Valentine v. NebuAd,
No. CV 08 5113 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2008), available at
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/califomia/candce/3:2008cv05113/208758/1/.
156. Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse
Datasets, at 111-12, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2008 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY
(2008), available at http://userweb.cs.utexas.edu/-shmat/shmatoak08netflix.pdf, at 1-2.
157. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 20-21.
158. Google Letter, supra note 133, at 8 (noting Google's decision to anonymize IP
addresses and cookie-based identification numbers after 18 months, even when these are not
personally identifying, because "we believe that our users would prefer that we further
anonymize this data after a reasonable period of time.").
159. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503-05 (describing how DoubleClick engages in
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course, anonymization would mean, at a minimum, the elimination of
obviously identifying information, like a consumer's name, address,
social security number, e-mail address, phone number, and so forth. 16 0
But computer scientists caution that even in datasets where this
obviously identifying information has been removed, it is remarkably
easy to identify particular users.16' Researchers were able to identify
the users associated with anonymized information from the Netflix
Prize dataset using data gleaned from IMDB (a movie-related website
that offers users the opportunity to rate movies).16 2 Netflix offered the
Prize to any researcher who could improve Netflix's movie
suggestion technique by a designated margin, and could demonstrate
that improvement on a sample "anonymous" dataset of consumers'
movie ratings that Netflix made available.163 The researchers found
that if they disregarded an anonymous consumer's favorable ratings
of the 100 most popular movies from the Netflix data, the pattern of
consumer likes and dislikes was fairly unique.'" Then, through
correlation of this pattern of unique likes and dislikes (between the
Netflix and IMDB data), the researchers were able to discern the
consumers' identities.165 And, although Netflix's anonymization
efforts may have been incomplete, the scientists suggest that their
methods for reconstructing consumers' identities from anonymized
data would have worked even if Netflix had modified dates, added
deliberate errors, or taken other steps to obfuscate the consumers'
identities whose preferences the data described.16 6 Netflix cancelled
plans for a second Netflix Prize because of the attendant privacy
concerns.167
Other researchers have come to similar conclusions. Stanford
University researchers have reported that a date of birth is highly
behavioral advertising without knowing a user's identity).
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. Id
163. Netflix, Netflix Prize, http://www.netflixprize.com (last visited May 12, 2009).
164. Bruce Schneier, Why 'Anonymous' Data Sometimes Isn't, WIRED.COM, Dec. 13,
2007,
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/12/securitymatters_1
213 (describing the Narayanan and Shmatikov work).
165. Id
166. Id. When a reputable organization like Netflix fails to implement effective
anonymization of a dataset that they intended to publicly release, it is easy to imagine other
profilers making the same mistake in the maintenance of their own profiles, especially if they do
not anticipate researchers and others testing the anonymization.
167. Lohr, supra note 150.
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valuable when attempting to discern someone's identity."' Other
researchers have concluded that about half of the U.S. population can
be identified using only their gender, date of birth, and the city of
residence.169 In essence, even information that does not appear to
disclose a person's identity can readily do so when combined with
other data.170
Indeed, the AOL dataset that led to the New York Times
reporters' identification of Ms. Arnold was anonymized before AOL
released it for scholarly study.' 7 ' AOL later apologized and removed
the data, which they claimed had not been duly authorized for
release.172 Because of the release, AOL's chief technology officer
resigned and AOL fired a whole team of researchers.173
C. The Benefits ofBehavioral Targeting
While the privacy concerns associated with behavioral targeting
are significant, the benefits of this technology are compelling and far
less contingent than the risks. Behavioral advertising, for instance, is
one way of funding the generation and delivery of content on the
Internet.174 Other forms of behavioral targeting promise to connect
consumers with old friends, new friends, and useful products the
consumer will likely enjoy. Internet businesses are already using
behavioral targeting to provide these benefits to consumers. On the
other hand, the risks associated with behavioral targeting are largely
contingent on some kind of unexpected or improper behavior, such as
an inappropriate disclosure or misuse of consumer profile data. Thus,
if the risks of harm to consumers can be effectively managed, and
service providers share the benefits of the technology with their
customers, the technology benefits both profilers and consumers.
Behavioral advertising, for instance, allows content providers to
fund the delivery of web-based content and services to consumers on
the Internet.' 75 One way of providing web-based content is to require
168. Schneier, supra note 164.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Schneier, supra note 164.
174. See infra notes 176-78.
175. Google Letter, supra note 133, at 2; Behavioral Advertising: Industry Practice and
Consumers' Expectations Before the Joint Hearing of the Subcomm. on Communications,
Technology and the Internet and the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection
of the H Comm. On Energy and Commerce Committee , 11Ith Cong. 3 (2009), available at
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consumers to pay directly for the service (a "subscription-based"
approach). 176 Another is to follow the broadcast television model of
allowing advertising to pay content providers for providing a service
to consumers (an "advertising-based" model). 177
The advertising-based approach is advantageous for both
advertisers and consumers. Behavioral advertising, as compared to
other forms of advertising, offers advertisers an efficient method of
precisely targeting a valuable demographic. 7  It is, in fact, so
efficient that it offers companies "the highest return on investment for
dollars spent on e-advertising-a value that is only diminished by the
controversial nature of [the] tracking technology."1 7 9 Consumers
respond to this new technology. They are "at least ten percent more
receptive to behaviorally targeted advertisements than to contextually
targeted advertisements."iso The market for behavioral advertising is
expected to grow "from $350 million in 2006 to $3.8 billion by
2011.""' The technology also helps small businesses compete, even
when their customers would ordinarily be too diffuse to reach through
other advertising outlets.' 8 2
Indeed, Microsoft's CEO, Steve Ballmer lauded the technology:
"The more we know about customer behavior, the more every ad is
relevant."' 83  This relevance works both ways. Of course, this
relevance means that the advertiser is able to use its advertising
budget to target those customers it most wishes to reach. But it also
means that when a consumer sees an ad, it is more likely to be
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press 111/20090618/testimony toth.pdf (Testimony of Anne
Toth, Vice President of Policy and Head of Privacy, Yahoo! Inc.); PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at
1 ("[consumers] may also benefit, however, from the free content that online advertising
generally supports, as well as the personalization of advertising that many consumers appear to
value.").
176. Hotaling, supra note 13, at 540.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 533-38.
179. Id. at 536.
180. Id. at 538 (quoting Tameka Kee, Revenue Science Finds Behavioral Targeting Ads
22% More Effective, MEDIAPOST PUBLICATIONS, Sep. 12, 2007, http://www.mediapost.com/
publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art aid=67293). Contextually targeted advertisements
are those that are targeted without the use of a consumer profile; PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 29
("[C]ontextual advertising differs from behaviorally targeted advertising because it is based only
on the content of a particular website or search query, rather than on information about the
consumer collected over time.").
181. Hotaling, supra note 13, at 539.
182. Google Letter, supra note 133, at 2. This efficiency is especially true when one thinks
of the limited advertising budgets of small businesses-especially new small businesses.
183. Hotaling, supra note 13, at 536-37.
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relevant (and therefore usefull 84) to him or her. 185 Consumers will see
ads that are more likely to be appealing, useful, and appropriately
tailored to their sensibilities. 186 Revenue resulting from the ad's
placement then can fund Internet-based content and services.187
Google credits revenue from online advertising for funding its free e-
mail, search, and geographic information services. 88
Consumers already reap the benefits of free services funded
through behavioral advertising. 18 9 In spite of the potential for
profiling to harm consumers, the prevalence of harm stemming from
profiling appears quite low. 190 This is not to say that abuse and misuse
do not occur. But, considering the concrete and widespread benefits
that behavioral targeting already provides, it makes little sense to
enact a remedial scheme that hampers the advancement of a generally
helpful technology.19' Indeed, behavioral advertising is already being
used to aggregate a commodity-consumer information-that, to the
individual consumer, has little exchange value into a valuable product
that allows the consumer to access relevant and free Internet
content. 192
And, the benefits of behavioral targeting are not limited to the
behavioral advertising context. Other forms of behavioral targeting
also provide benefits for consumers. Facebook uses consumers'
profiles to connect its customers to other potential acquaintances.
Amazon suggests products that consumers might enjoy. 193 Netflix
suggests movies the consumer might enjoy. Not only are these
184. Google Letter, supra note 133, at 2.
185. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 1, 6, 9-10.
186. Id
187. Id; Google Letter, supra note 133, at 2.
188. Google Letter, supra note 133, at 2.
189. Id.
190. See Bennet Kelley, Privacy and Online Behavioral Advertising, 11 J. OF INTERNET
LAW 24, Dec. 2007 (noting that a "recurring theme" during the FTC's hearings was "the failure
of those advocating further regulation to demonstrate any specific instances of harm."). One of
the FTC's Commissioners, Mozelle Thompson, is reported as saying "the FTC should not take
any action at all in the absence of evidence of consumer harm." Id. See also Diane Bartz, FTC
Urged to Limit Behavioral Advertising, EWEEK, Apr. 18, 2008 (reporting that the American
Advertising Federation, Association of National Advertisers, and other organizations had issued
a statement asserting that "any additional principles or guidelines should be issued only after the
[FTC] specifically identifies harms and concerns so that business is in a position to consider and
address them").
191. See Kelley, supra note 190; Bartz, supra note 190.
192. Consumer data may have little exchange value, but obviously has other value for
consumers.
193. Amazon.com, Help, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html (last
visited May 12, 2009).
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benefits compelling, but they come without some of the dangers
associated with behavioral advertising. For instance, consumers often
volunteer the information the companies use to make these
recommendations. 194 Often, a consumer can see why a website
offered a particular recommendation.1 95 Of course, even this form of
profiling is not without privacy risks. In fact, the risks may be greater;
companies like Amazon and Facebook store personally identifying
information about consumers (name, address, phone number, and e-
mail), so the risks of identity theft and embarrassment are heightened
with respect to the unexpected disclosure of this data.
The benefits of behavioral targeting are, in fact, so compelling
that some Internet service providers have attempted to appropriate for
themselves the financial benefits of behavioral advertising. A recently
filed complaint in California alleges that several Internet service
providers (ISPs) are using the deep packet inspection form of
behavioral advertising to turn their clients' data into a revenue stream
for themselves, even though the ISP's clients are already directly
paying for service. 19 6 These ISPs are using a device from NebuAd' 97
that plugs directly into the ISP's network equipment, allowing the
equipment access to all Internet data sent to and from any and all of
the ISP's customers. 198 The complaint also alleges that adequate
notice was not given to the customers whose Internet traffic was
rigorously deconstructed, examined, analyzed, and manipulated. 199
The complaint further alleges that following an opt-out procedure did
not actually opt the consumer out of this process of constant
inspection of his or her Internet traffic.200 Similar allegations are
levied, in the United Kingdom, against British Telecom and Phorm,
another seller of deep packet inspection appliances. 20 ' British
194. E.g., id
195. E.g., id.
196. Complaint at 23, Valentine v. NebuAd, No. CV 08 5113 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2008),
available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/california/candce/3:2008cv05113/208758/1/ (according to Bob Dykes, NebuAd's CEO:
"The ISPs have not been able share in ad revenue and wealth creation around the publishing side
of the intemet.").
197. Id. at 16-17.
198. Id.; See generally supra Part I.A.
199. Complaint at 36, Valentine v. NebuAd, No. CV 08 5113 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2008),
available at http://docsjustia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/califomia/candce/3:2008cv05113/208758/1/.
200. Id. at 24-25. The opt-out procedure allegedly prevented the consumer from receiving
targeted ads, but did nothing to stop the NebuAd appliances from performing deep packet
inspection on all of the data the consumer sent to or received from devices on the internet. Id.
201. Kevin J. O'Brien, Use of Web Tracking Tool Raises Privacy Issue in Britain, N.Y.
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Telecom admits that it did not obtain consumers' consent to employ
-202these appliances.
II. LAWS APPLICABLE TO BEHAVIORAL TARGETING
The legal rules that presently apply to behavioral targeting
cannot effectively deter improper use of consumer information or
compensate victims when abuse or misuse occurs. To be sure, there
are a variety of laws that may apply to provide redress for those who
suffer significant harm from behavioral targeting, but plaintiffs
seeking redress have failed, so far, to convince the courts that
behavioral targeting violates their rights.2 03 And, often, a viable
private lawsuit will be insurmountably difficult for a typical plaintiff
to bring.204 Public enforcement, in the form of the FTC enforcement
action, is also rare and appears to be confined to the most egregious
cases. 205
Because profilers' collection practices often operate in a manner
invisible to the consumer, it is difficult for consumers to bring private
suits; even when a consumer suspects that she has been harmed, the
consumer may not know who to sue, and may lack the evidence
necessary to prove liability and damages.20 6 The consumer who sees
an ad may not know whether it is a behavioral ad, nor does the
consumer even necessarily become aware of which advertisers are
profiling.2 07 The consumer also does not know the content of her
profile.2 08 Moreover, because behavioral advertisers need not and
often do not know a consumer's identity,209 a plaintiff faces a
difficult, if not completely insurmountable, challenge to match
inappropriately disclosed data to a suspected source to prove
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2009.
202. Id.
203. In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 526-27.
204. Hotaling, supra note 13, at 559.
205. See infra Part III.D.
206. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 526 (dismissing the plaintiffs' claims in
part because their Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim did not support a sufficient claim for
damages).
207. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 33-37.
208. Id. Not only do consumers not know the contents of profiles in a general sense (i.e.
what sort of information a profiler collects), but they are unable to know the contents in a
specific sense (i.e. "What specific information does the profiler have in their database about
me?"). But see Stephanie Clifford, Many See Privacy on Web as Big Issue, Survey Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2009, at B5 (reporting that Google has plans to allow a consumer to see what
data it has collected about the consumer).
209. In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503-05 (describing how DoubleClick engages
in behavioral advertising without knowing a user's identity).
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causation - she cannot merely ask a profiler to produce all
information associated with her name.210 Consumer and privacy
advocates argue that behavioral advertisers have cultivated this
information gap to avoid legal accountability. 211
A. Tort Claims
Nonetheless, there are legal theories under which a consumer can
seek redress when behavioral advertisers inappropriately collect or
disclose consumer data. For instance, most states have adopted the
torts of intrusion on seclusion and public disclosure of private facts.2 12
Moreover, the torts of defamation, negligence, and trespass to
property may also provide some redress to consumers harmed by
behavioral targeting.
The restatement of torts describes the first of these legal
theories-intrusion on seclusion-as an intentional intrusion "physically
or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns" and subjects the intruder to liability "if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."213
Because the tort targets the intrusion rather than the release of
information, it is more likely to be useful to address a profiler's
collection of especially private information rather than the
information's inappropriate disclosure.2 14 The restatement uses a
wiretap to illustrate the tort: "A, a private detective seeking evidence
for use in a lawsuit, rents a room in a house adjoining B's residence,
and ... taps B's telephone wires and installs a recording device to
make a record of B's conversations. A has invaded B's privacy." 2 15
Behavioral advertising can be likened to wiretapping. 2 16 Even so, the
requirement that the intrusion be "highly offensive to a reasonable
person" establishes a high threshold for liability. It is not clear, for
instance, that when AOL recorded that Ms. Arnold searched for men
near her age, the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, particularly if one purpose of the "intrusion" was to allow
AOL to satisfy Ms. Arnold's search request.
210. See Hotaling, supra note 13, at 548-49, 558 (observing that opt-in requirements
address this problem and that the consumer's lack of knowledge about the profiler and its
activities is the most significant barrier to asserting some level of consumer control).
211. Id.
212. JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 451-52 (2d ed. 2000).
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (emphasis added).
214. See id.
215. Id. (based upon Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1931)).
216. In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
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Similarly, the tort of public disclosure of private facts is defined
as giving "publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another ... if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate
concern to the public."2 17 This tort, unlike the tort of intrusion on
seclusion, focuses on publicizing private data, and would therefore be
useful for deterring and redressing inappropriate disclosure.2 18
However, as with the tort of intrusion on seclusion, the "highly
offensive to a reasonable person" standard is a formidable threshold
for a plaintiff to overcome. 2 19 Moreover, the tort requires disclosure to
a large group; disclosure to a single person or small group does not
trigger liability.220
The law of defamation may aid victims of disclosures of false
information. 22 1 Under the law of defamation, a defendant is liable for
a published defamatory statement concerning a plaintiff,222 unless the
defendant can prove the statement is true.223 In addition, the incorrect
information must be negligently or intentionally published to some
third person.224 One advantage of a defamation theory is that damages
for the emotional distress of the disclosure are often presumed.22 5
Because defamation targets false statements, it might be especially
valuable for consumers harmed by the disclosure of incorrect inferred
information, as described in part I.B.
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (emphasis added).
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. Id.
221. The likelihood that a consumer's profile would contain false information is difficult
to assess. False information could, perhaps, be the result of incorrect inferences. See supra Part
I.B. It could also be the result of errors in profiling that result from a profiler's inability to
accurately distinguish among computer sharers. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 22. Regardless of
how errors occur, privacy advocates recognize that there are circumstances in which a
consumer's profile will not be correct, and a consumer will want to correct the error. Ciocchetti,
supra note 123, at 37-38. To the extent that errors remain in a profiler's database, some of these
errors may rise to the level of actionable defamation.
222. DIAMOND, supra note 212, at 432-33. Under the law of defamation, special
constitutional rules apply to speech that arguably defames public figures, but I assume in this
analysis that the consumer is not a public figure. Id at 442-50.
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977).
224. See id. § 558.
225. DIAMOND, supra note 212, at 437. Some courts have been unwilling to recognize the
dignitary harm stemming from profiling as a harm that the law should remedy, even when
consumers are forced as a result of a data breach to monitor their credit reports for indications of
financial fraud and identity theft. Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 101, at 101-02. Thus, the
defamation claim's presumption of damages might, in an appropriate case, be quite valuable to
the plaintiff.
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A negligence theory may also prove useful for redressing harm
resulting from data breaches, as long as courts are willing to concur
that a profiler owes consumers a duty to take reasonable steps to
safeguard their data.2 26 Under a negligence theory, a plaintiff would
have to prove the breach of such a duty caused the plaintiffs
damages.22 7 Negligence, however, would provide no redress to
consumers whose data is disclosed in spite of a profiler's reasonable
efforts to prevent inappropriate disclosure.228 In one recent data
breach case, TJX, a company that experienced a massive data breach
not related to behavioral targeting, settled a lawsuit employing the
negligence theory for nearly $41 million to compensate banks for
their losses from the data breach.229
In another recent case, In Re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy
Litigation, 230 a class of plaintiffs sought to hold DoubleClick, a
cookie-based behavioral advertiser, liable for the tort of trespass to
property. 23' The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's tracking
cookies made use of the plaintiffs' own computers to deprive the
plaintiffs of their privacy.232 Generally, the tort of trespass to property
requires the plaintiff to show that a defendant has damaged the
property or deprived the plaintiff of its use,233 although defendants are
not liable when plaintiffs consent to the trespass.234 Unfortunately, the
federal court declined to hear the supplemental state law tort claim
after it dismissed the plaintiffs' claims based on federal law.235
B. Federal Statutory Claims
However, the DoubleClick plaintiffs principally premised their
236
complaint on alleged violations of three federal statutes. The
plaintiffs argued that the placement of tracking cookies on plaintiffs'
computers violated these statutes regardless of whether the defendants
226. DIAMOND, supra note 212, at 51.
227. Id. at 50-51.
228. Id. at 51-52.
229. Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 101, at 98-99.
230. In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d. at 497.
231. Id. at 500.
232. Id.
233. DIAMOND, supra note 212, at 21.
234. See id. at 34.
235. In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 526-27 ("When federal claims are dismissed,
retention of state law claims under supplemental jurisdiction is left to the discretion of the trial
court.... We decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims.").
236. Id. at 500.
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improperly disclosed the information it learned as a result. 2 37
Plaintiffs made their first claim under ECPA, or, more specifically,
Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. 238 ECPA
"aims to prevent hackers from obtaining, altering, or destroying
certain stored electronic communications."239 It provides for
punishment for a defendant that "(1) intentionally accesses without
authorization a facility through which an electronic information
service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to
access that facility; and thereby obtains . . . access to a wire or
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such
system." 24 0 The court concluded, however, that DoubleClick's
behavioral advertising fell within an exception to the statute's
proscriptions for "conduct authorized ... by a user of that [wire or
electronic communications] service with respect to a communication
of or intended for that user." 2 4 1 The court reasoned that the websites
with which the plaintiffs communicated were users of the
communication facility and these websites authorized DoubleClick's
actions when they incorporated DoubleClick's enabling programming
into their websites. 242 Thus, when a website operator consents to the
use of cookie-based consumer profiling, and the profiling conforms to
the scope of the consent, an aggrieved Internet consumer cannot
succeed in an ECPA claim against the profiler.243
However, in In Re Pharmatrak Privacy Litigation, the plaintiffs'
ECPA claims were slightly more successful.24 4 The Pharmatrak
plaintiffs convinced the court that the defendant company had
accessed the plaintiffs' communications (containing their data)
without authorization.2 45 The defendant, Pharmatrak, Inc., marketed a
cookie-based profiling product to pharmaceutical companies that
tracked consumers' website visits across several pharmaceutical
industry websites for the purpose of allowing industry-wide analysis
and comparison of Internet consumer trends.246 After Pharmatrak
collected personally identifying information about consumers in
237. Id. at 499.
238. Id. at 507.
239. Id.
240. Id. (emphasis added).
241. In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 507.
242. Id. at 508-10.
243. Id
244. In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 329 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 2003).
245. Id
246. Id
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contradiction of assurances to its pharmaceutical company customers,
the court concluded that the interception of consumer data was not
authorized.247 Nonetheless, Pharmatrak escaped liability on remand
because the court concluded the interceptions were not intentional.248
The DoubleClick plaintiffs' Wiretap Act 24 9 claim fell victim to
the same reasoning that undercut their ECPA claim. 2 50 The Wiretap
Act prohibits the intentional interception of an electronic
communication, which DoubleClick conceded that it had done.251
DoubleClick responded, however, that its conduct fell within an
exception to liability for wiretaps to which one party consented.2 52
The court agreed.253 It reasoned that although the plaintiffs
themselves had not consented, the operators of the websites that the
plaintiffs visited consented when they incorporated DoubleClick's
enabling programming into their websites.2 54
Finally, the DoubleClick plaintiffs also alleged that DoubleClick
had violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).2 55 The
CFAA prohibits the intentional access of a computer without
authorization or in excess of the authorization.2 56 However, the CFAA
also limits private causes of action to situations involving
"impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a
system, or information that ... causes loss aggregating at least $5,000
in value during any 1-year period." 25 7 The plaintiffs, the court
concluded, had not pleaded any facts to suggest that they could show
such extensive damages.258 The court also reasoned that the invasion
of the plaintiffs' privacy, trespass to the plaintiffs' personal property,
and misappropriation of the plaintiffs' data, even if proven, were not
economic losses that could count toward the $5,000 floor. 25 9 The
247. Id.
248. In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 292 F. Supp. 2d 263 (D. Mass. 2003)
(granting summary judgment because the collection was not intentional). See also Hotaling,
supra note 13, at 548.
249. 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et. seq. (2006).
250. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
251. Id. at 514.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 519-20.
256. In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
257. Id. at 520 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (2000) (amended 2001)). See also id. at
523 (concluding that all damages and losses are subject to the $5,000 floor).
258. Id. at 526.
259. See id. at 525, n.33.
2011] 39
40 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 27
court's reasoning suggests that DoubleClick's actions were improper,
but not enough for a court to provide a remedy under the CFAA.260
A currently pending class-action suit, Valentine v. NebuAd, also
asserts ECPA and CFAA claims against NebuAd, a deep packet
inspection-based behavioral advertiser.261 These claims may be
stronger against a deep packet inspection-based profiler (compared to
a cookie-based profiler) because the profiler does not obtain any form
of consent from either the consumer or the website the consumer
VIiS262visits.26
C. Unjust Enrichment Claims
The plaintiffs in both DoubleClick and NebuAd also made claims
under the common law theory of unjust enrichment.263 Unjust
enrichment allows for recovery in situations where a defendant has
been unfairly enriched at the plaintiff s expense.2 64 Unjust enrichment
is a proven basis for liability when a defendant misuses information
belonging to the plaintiff for its own purposes. 2 65 The DoubleClick
court refused to consider this state law claim after it dismissed the
plaintiffs' federal statutory claims.266 However, the NebuAd plaintiffs
also make an unjust enrichment claim, alleging that NebuAd "has
received and retains information regarding specific purchase and
transactional information that is otherwise private, confidential, and
not of public record and/or have received revenue from the provision
of such information."267 Further, the NebuAd plaintiffs also allege that
NebuAd knows of the benefit and "should not be permitted to retain
the information and/or revenue which they acquired .... All funds,
revenues, and benefits received by Defendants rightfully belong to
Plaintiffs."268 So long as the court is willing to recognize that
260. See id. at 519-27.
261. See Complaint, Valentine v. NebuAd, No. CV 08 5113 (N.D. Cal. Nov 10, 2008),
available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/california/candce/3:2008cv05113/208758/1/.
262. See id. at 24-25.
263. Id. at 1; In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 500.
264. See DAN B. DoBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION 371 (2d
ed. 1993).
265. Id. at 375 & n.21 (citing e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965)).
266. In re DoubleClick, 154. F. Supp. 2d at 526-27.
267. See Complaint, Valentine v. NebuAd, Inc., No. CV 08 5113 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10,
2008), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/califomia/candce/3:2008cv05113/208758/1/.
268. Id. at 48-49.
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intercepted communications are a kind of property or benefit that
belongs to a consumer, this claim is promising.
Behavioral advertisers have asserted elsewhere, however, that
they believe that "consumers do not own the data that [profilers]
collect about them, and that there is no precedent for giving
consumers the ability to dictate the terms on which they use a
website." 269  This approach effectively analogizes consumer
information to unowned wild animals or unowned running water,
which, at common law, became the property of the person who
reduced them to possession. 27 0 Therefore, according to this line of
reasoning, because a profiler exerts the effort to reduce consumer
information to possession, the profiler ought to be regarded as the
owner. 27 1 The NebuAd court may have to sort out whether the
consumer or the profiler has the better claim to the data and the
benefits of using it.
D. The Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission currently plays a larger role than
private plaintiffs in deterring and redressing the inappropriate
272
collection and disclosure of consumer profile information. In the
Federal Trade Commission Act, Congress vested the FTC with broad
powers to regulate unfair and deceptive trade practices: "Unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby
declared unlawful."273 However, the Act limits unfairness to
situations where "the act or practice causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits
to consumers or to competition." 2 74 The FTC reports that it has
brought twenty-three actions between 2001 and February 2009
against companies that "allegedly have failed to provide reasonable
protections for sensitive consumer information in both online and
269. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 31.
270. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 177, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (concluding
that a hunter who spirited away an injured fox was the first to reduce it to possession).
271. See, e.g., id. at 178 (concluding that wild animals become property when reduced to
possession); Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918) (concluding that,
while nobody can own the news, the efforts to gather fresh news confer on the gatherer a quasi-
property right relative to competitors only).
272. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 5 n.8.
273. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006) (known as § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act).
274. Id. at § 45(n)
2011] 41
42 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 27
offline settings."27 5 While this may sound impressive, it amounts to
only about eight actions per year.276 The FTC has, however, indicated
that it intends to continue to use its authority to secure compliance
when companies fail to implement reasonable measures to address the
privacy and security risks to consumers' information.277 Similarly, the
FTC has signaled it will also investigate companies that use collected
data in a manner inconsistent with the privacy policies or other
agreements under which the data is collected.278 Finally, the FTC also
"intends, where appropriate, to initiate investigations of possible
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in this area that would potentially
violate . . . the FTC Act." 27 9
The FTC also enforces the provisions of the Child Online
Privacy Protection Act, or COPPA.280 COPPA is intended to prevent
websites from obtaining personal information from children without
281parental consent. It also puts parents in a position of control over
their children's personal information.2 82 COPPA requires website
operators to provide, on parental request:
(i) a description of the specific types of personal information
collected from the child by that operator; (ii) the opportunity at any
time to refuse to permit the operator's further use or maintenance
in retrievable form, or future online collection, of personal
information from that child; and (iii) notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a means that is reasonable under the
circumstances for the parent to obtain any personal information
collected from that child.283
Because COPPA gives parents the right to refuse an operator
permission to continue to collect or use already collected information,
and to see what information the operator has collected, COPPA gives
parents far more control over their children's privacy than adults
have, even under the FTC's recently-issued self-regulatory
275. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 5 n.8.
276. See also Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Future of Privacy Policies: A Privacy Nutrition
Label Filled With Fair Information Practices, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 1, 27
(2008) ("[T]he FTC has brought fewer than thirty actions over the past ten years.").
277. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 19.
278. See id
279. Id at 20.
280. 15 U.S.C. § 6501, et. seq.
281. See id. at § 6502.
282. See id. at § 6502(b) (requiring the FTC to enact regulations that "collect[] personal
information from children" to "obtain verifiable parental consent for the collection, use, or
disclosure" of that information).
283. Id. at § 6502.
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principles.284
The FTC has enforced this law and its own rules made under
COPPA's mandate for agency rulemaking.2 85
III. THE FTC's SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES
Because the FTC is charged with the regulation of unfair or
deceptive acts or practices, the FTC recently issued a set of self-
regulatory principles to guide companies that engage in behavioral
286 prnilst
advertising. The principles were also intended to assuage privacy
concerns stemming from the FTC's approval of the
Google/DoubleClick merger.2 87 The process began with a two day
"Town Hall" event intended to facilitate a public discussion about the
benefits and privacy risks associated with behavioral advertising.2 88
Then, the FTC drafted a set of proposed self-regulatory principles and
published them for comment. 28 9 After receiving a wide variety of
comments, the FTC issued a final set of self-regulatory principles.290
The FTC process is laudable because the self-regulatory principles
advance consumers' privacy interests in a way likely to be reasonably
acceptable to behavioral advertisers. The principles are clear and
relatively detailed. 29 1 Therefore, they are likely to reduce the privacy
risks associated with behavioral advertising across all companies that
endorse and follow them.292
This part first discusses the scope of the principles, and then
proceeds to a discussion of each of the four principles: (1)
"meaningful disclosure," (2) "reasonable data security measures," (3)
"affirmative express consent" to "material changes to privacy
policies," and (4) "affirmative express consent before [using]
sensitive data."293
284. Compare id. § 6502 with PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 46-47.
285. See, e.g., United States v. Industrious Kid, No. CV 08-0639 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28. 2008),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723082/080730comp.pdf
286. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at iii.
287. Bartz, supra note 190.
288. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at i-ii.
289. Id. at ii.
290. Id.
291. See id at 30-48 (describing the need for each of the principles, and what advertisers
must do to comply with the principles).
292. See id. at 11 (conceding that existing self-regulatory efforts "had not provided
comprehensive and accessible protections to consumers" and that the FTC intended the
principles to "guide industry in developing more meaningful and effective self-regulat[ion]."
293. Id. at ll-12.
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A. Scope of the Principles
Unfortunately, the self-regulatory principles do not fully address
the harm associated with behavioral targeting. They exclude from
their scope several forms of behavioral targeting, even though these
forms of targeting pose the same risks as all forms of consumer
profiling.
First, the FTC has eliminated all non-advertising behavioral
targeting from the principles' applicability.2 94 The FTC has sought
information on "the potential uses of tracking data other than for
behavioral advertising," 29 5 but not yet received a robust level of
296information on these uses. Therefore, the principles do not address
any of the privacy risks associated with consumer profiling for
purposes other than behavioral advertising.
However, the principles do apply to any behavioral advertiser
that "track[s] consumers' online activities to deliver advertising that is
targeted to individual consumers' interests."297 This statement appears
to apply to the "spyware" and deep packet inspection-based
advertisers, such as NebuAd and Phorm, even though the FTC's
principles primarily focus on the cookie-based network advertisers,
such as Google/DoubleClick.
Nor do the principles apply to contextual advertising, which is
nothing more than the display of an advertisement targeted to a
consumer based on the content of a webpage the consumer visited.2 98
Because contextual advertising does not involve the compilation and
storage of a profile of consumers' behavior, the FTC concluded it did
not pose the same risk of privacy-related harms as behavioral
advertising.299
The principles also do not apply to "first party" targeting. 300 The
FTC observed that consumers value a variety of practices that require
websites to collect data directly from the consumer, such as "product
recommendations, tailored content, shopping cart services, website
design and optimization, fraud detection, and security."30 1 The FTC
294. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 20 ("[T~he Principles apply broadly to companies
engaged in online behavioral advertising.").
295. Id. at 12.
296. Id. at iv.
297. Id at 20.
298. Id at 29.
299. Id
300. Id at 26. See generally supra Part I.A.
301. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 20.
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concluded that these activities are more likely to be consistent with
consumer expectations.302 For instance,.on a site like Amazon.com
that offers recommendations based on past purchases, the consumer
supplies the information that the website uses to make suggestions
directly to the website. 30 3 Therefore, the consumer is better able to
understand what data was used to generate the advertisement.3 04
Further, consumers can raise any objections with these websites, since
consumers know their identities.305 The FTC also reasoned that while
the principles may not apply, the FTC Act still allowed the FTC to
regulate these companies' information security practices and privacy
policy compliance.30 6
Finally, the FTC decided that the principles would apply to the
collection of both personally identifying information ("PII") and
information that is not personally identifying ("NPII").307 While
industry groups argued that NPII poses little risk of privacy-related
harm to consumers, the FTC concluded that it could draw no
distinction between PII and NPII because the two can sometimes be
merged, and because, as previously discussed, it is increasingly
possible to identify consumers based only on data that is considered
NPII. 308 The FTC also concluded that there was a distinct privacy risk
associated with NPII: behavioral advertising methods at present
cannot reliably distinguish among computer sharers, so there is a risk
that stored NPII for one person might result in ads that essentially
compromise that person's privacy to other users of the same
computer.3 09 Lastly, the FTC concluded that consumers' privacy
concerns were not limited to PII, and that consumers would not want
protection limited to PII.3"o
Nevertheless, the FTC chose to limit the principles' scope to
information "that reasonably could be associated with a particular
consumer or with a particular computer or device." 3 11 The FTC
largely left behavioral advertisers to evaluate for themselves the
factual circumstances of their data collection practices and to draw
302. Id.
303. Id. at 27.
304. Id
305. Id.
306. Id. at 28 n. 57.
307. Id. at 20-21.
308. Id. at 22-23.
309. Id. at 23.
310. Id. at 23-34.
311. Id. at 25.
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their own conclusions about which data the principles apply to.312
Consumers are therefore left to bear the risks of profilers' mistaken or
self-serving conclusions.
B. Transparency and Consumer Control
The first of the FTC's principles addresses the "transparency"
problem.3 14 It requires websites that collect behavioral advertising
data to (1) state that they are doing so and (2) allow consumers to opt
out of this collection.1 It also requires behavioral advertisers who
collect data outside the "traditional website context" to "develop
alternative methods of disclosure and consumer choice that meet the
standards described above."3 16 The disclosure should be "clear,
concise, consumer-friendly, and prominent." 317
The FTC did not prohibit behavioral advertisers from placing the
required disclosures in a website's privacy policy, even though
"privacy policies have become long and difficult to understand, and
may not be an effective way to communicate information to
consumers."" The principles encourage alternative methods of
disclosure, such as locating the disclosure in proximity to behavioral
ads. 319
The FTC also did not prohibit websites from conditioning use of
a website on the consumer's permission to conduct behavioral
advertising.320 This raises the serious concern that consumer control
under this principle will be illusory. Indeed, since advertising
generates the revenue that makes many websites' content possible,
these websites need to have consumers who help them pay for their
operations.32 1 Websites may therefore refuse to serve customers who
opt out. If consumers have nothing more than a "take-it-or-leave-it"
choice, they have little real choice.
312. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 25.
313. See id.
314. Id. at 30. This problem is really a need for opacity, not transparency, because
behavioral advertising is in fact already so "transparent" that a consumer cannot see that it is
happening! See id. at 31-32 n.62.
315. Id. at 46. Of course, the stronger protections inherent in an opt-in system would be
consistent with this principle as well. Id. at 32, n. 63.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 34-35.
319. Id.
320. See id at 30-37.
321. See Google Letter, supra note 133, at 2.
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C. Reasonable Security and Limited Retention of Consumer Data
The FTC's second principle calls for reasonable security and
limited retention for consumer data.322 The appropriate level of
security is commensurate with the data's sensitivity, the nature of the
"company's business operations," the risks a company faces, and the
reasonable protections available to the company. 323 Further,
companies must retain data only as long as is necessary to fulfill a
"legitimate business or law enforcement need."324 In establishing this
principle, the FTC rejected without explanation consumer and privacy
advocates' invitations to establish an explicit retention period or a
requirement that retained data be anonymized.3 25 Likewise, the FTC
puzzlingly rejected the notion that data should be retained only for as
long as was needed to fulfill the business purposes explained to the
consumer when the data was collected.326
D. Express Consent for Retroactive Changes to Privacy
Promises
The FTC's third principle requires companies to obtain
"affirmative express consent" prior to using data "in a manner
materially different from promises the company made when it
collected the data." 327 This principle protects consumers from
unexpected changes in the way profilers handle their information.
Some profilers, worried about the burdens of compliance, had chosen
to operate without a privacy policy. 32 8 Others, however, chose to
implement "a privacy policy filled with legalese and loopholes,
subject to amendment at any time."329 Of course, when a profiler can
change its privacy policy without notice, the privacy policy does little
to educate consumers about how the profiler uses the data it
collects. 33 0 The FTC also explicitly notes that this principle protects
322. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 46.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 37-38.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 47. The FTC does not explain how "affirmative express consent" is different
than "express consent." See id. What form of consent isn't affirmative? But see id at 44, n. 77
("[P]re-checked boxes or disclosures that are buried in a privacy policy or uniform licensing
agreement are unlikely to be sufficiently prominent to obtain a consumer's 'affirmative express
consent."').
328. See Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 101, at 126.
329. Id.
330. See Ciocchetti, supra note 123, at 19, 34.
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consumers when profilers' privacy policies or data usage policies
change as a result of corporate mergers.
E. Express Consent to Use Sensitive Data
The FTC's final principle dictates that "[c]ompanies should
collect sensitive data for behavioral advertising only after they obtain
affirmative express consent from the consumer to receive such
advertising."3 3 2
The FTC chose, in adopting this principle, to avoid a concrete
definition of "sensitive data." 33 3 The commenters to the draft
principles did not agree on any definition of sensitive. 33 4 Therefore,
while noting that "financial data, data about children, health
information, precise geographic location, and Social Security
numbers are clearest examples" of sensitive data, the FTC invited
stakeholders to "develop more specific standards to address this
issue."335 The FTC rejected the idea of a complete ban on the
collection of sensitive data for behavioral advertising.33 6
The wording of this principle is unfortunate because it suggests
that the consent that consumers must give is "to receive such
advertising" rather than to the collection of sensitive consumer data
for advertising purposes.337 This wording suggests that the consumer
need only understand and consent to the kind of advertising the
consumer will receive, rather than requiring the profiler to obtain
consent to collect the supporting sensitive data.338 Based on the FTC's
stated concerns in enacting the principle,339 the latter approach makes
more sense. The FTC should clarify this point in the future.
IV. PROPOSALS TO INCREASE PRIVACY AND CONSUMER CONTROL
The vast majority of the proposals that address the potential
331. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 47.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 42.
334. Id at 44.
335. Id. at 44.
336. See id. at 43.
337. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 47.
338. See id.
339. See id at 42-44. The FTC, in particular, notes that protection is needed when
consumers believe "that they are searching anonymously for information about medications,
diseases, sexual orientation, or other highly sensitive topics." Id. at 44. Consent directed at the
advertisement rather than the collection of the sensitive data would not address this problem. See
id.
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harm stemming from behavioral targeting have focused on improving
the notice that consumers receive about the targeting and giving the
consumer more explicit choice about whether to participate in the
behavioral targeting. Indeed, a few of these proposals strengthen
consumer choice to a degree likely to seriously undercut behavioral
targeting-based Internet business models. Some of the proposals also
require profilers to safeguard the data they collect. None of the
existing proposals, however, truly give consumers a reasonable
understanding of the magnitude of potential harm or the likelihood
that harm will occur under the adaption of the Learned Hand formula
proposed in Part I.B.3.
A. Existing Proposals
Scholars, lawyers, and consumer and privacy advocates have
suggested a variety of ways to strengthen consumers' privacy
protections. Some of these proposals predate the FTC's self-
regulatory principles.
1. Opt-in Consent and Do Not Track Lists
These are two of the most mentioned ideas for improving
consumers' control over their information. The concept of opt-in
consent requires that profilers obtain consent from a consumer prior
to collecting data from the consumer. 34 0 The idea is attractive because
it forces profilers to disclose the desired profiling before data
collection and requires consumers to approve of it, which likely also
identifies the advertiser.341
The "do not track" list is an idea analogous to the "do not call"
list the FTC maintains to allow consumers to opt out of telephone
marketing.3 4 2 It would allow a consumer who wishes to avoid all
behavioral advertising (or perhaps even all behavioral targeting) to
indicate his preferences in a way that all profilers would be legally
compelled to read and obey. 343
While these ideas sound appealing, and may indeed be
worthwhile, there are two main problems with them. The first
problem is technical; the second is economic. Most likely, a
consumer's preference to opt in or participate in a "do not track" list
340. Hotaling, supra note 13, at 557-58.
341. Id.
342. Privacy Letter, supra note 93, at 4.
343. Id
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would be managed using a cookie.344 Unfortunately, a consumer
would have to repeat the enrollment process any time the consumer
used a new device, a new web browser, or after a consumer cleared
the cookies in her web browser.345 It might be difficult for consumers
to keep track of these cookies, which are designed for transparency to
the user. This technical difficulty could lead to increased confusion
among consumers. However, technical problems like these may have
easy-to-implement technical solutions.346 For example, a web browser
could automate the process of ensuring a "do not track" cookie is
present, or a convention could be adopted for profilers to set opt-in
cookies that would allow web browsers to distinguish them from
other cookies.347 Then, when the consumer cleared stored cookies
from the web browser, or installed a new web browser, the consumer
could choose whether to erase or automatically re-create the specially
designated cookies.348
The economic challenge is far more difficult. As mentioned
above, Internet content providers that rely on advertising for revenue
have no incentive to serve a customer who has opted out or refused to
opt in to the content provider's ad regime. 34 9 These customers would
tax resources with little or no return. A "do not track" list escalates
this problem to an extreme scale. Presumably, many consumers
would be attracted to the increased privacy offered by the "do not
track" list, and would sign up. Consequently, the pool of revenue-
generating consumers available to Internet content providers would
decrease radically in size. Content providers would be forced to
exclude consumers who refused to participate in the provider's
behavioral advertisement regime. This exclusion has the potential to
sharply curtail the proliferation of innovation and information on the
Internet. 350 And it gives consumers a ridiculous choice: use the
advertising-based services on the Internet and lose control of your
personal information or choose not to use any of these services.
344. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 34; Hotaling, supra note 13, at 554-55.
345. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 34; Hotaling, supra note 13, at 554-55.
346. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 34; Hotaling, supra note 13, at 554-55.
347. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 34; Hotaling, supra note 13, at 554-55.
348. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 34; Hotaling, supra note 13, at 554-55.
349. Supra Part V.B.
350. See Andrew McCormick, In-depth TV - Personalized ads herald future of TV,
REVOLUTION 8 (Jan. 9, 2009) (predicting that the improved efficiency of behavioral advertising
could drive television programming to the Internet).
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2. New York Legislation
In March 2008, a draft bill in the New York legislature would
have strengthened privacy protections.35 1 It flatly prohibited third-
party marketers from using "sensitive medical, financial or sexual
personally identifiable information or Social Security numbers" in
behavioral advertisements.352 It also required that marketers "obtain
online preference marketing data from reliable sources," "protect
online preference marketing data," and "impose online privacy
guidelines on PII recipients."353 Significantly, the bill may also have
imposed a modest anonymization requirement: "Non-PII that third-
party entities use for online preference marketing may not be linked
to a particular individual."3 54 Of course, with New York's sizable
population, the bill, if enacted, would have been likely to protect
consumers far outside New York's borders.
3. Failed Federal Legislation
In 2007, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy sponsored legislation that
would have imposed stronger controls on the collection and storage of
consumer information.356 The bill would impose "requirements for a
personal data privacy and security program on business entities that
maintain sensitive personally identifiable information in electronic or
digital form on 10,000 or more U.S. persons."357 It also "require[d]
[covered] business entities to:
(1) implement a comprehensive personal data privacy and security
program to ensure the privacy, security, and confidentiality of
sensitive personally identifying information and to protect against
breaches of and unauthorized access to such information; (2)
351. David Bender, Do Behavioral Ads Endanger Your Privacy?, NEW YORK LAW
JOURNAL, Apr. 2, 2008,
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1 207065969592 (last
visited 12/17/2010).
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. However, that protective effect may have constituted an unconstitutional burden
on interstate commerce under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. Ryan Paul,
NY Bill Would Police Intersection of Online Ads, Privacy, ARS TECHNICA,
http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/03/ny-bill-would-police-intersection-of-online-ads-
privacy.ars (last visited May 12, 2009).
356. Hotaling, supra note 13, at 563; Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, S. 495,
110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?billsl 10-
495&tab=summary.
357. Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s 110-495&tab-summary.
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conduct risk assessments of potential security breaches; (3) adopt
risk management and control policies and procedures; (4) ensure
employee training and supervision for implementation of data
security programs; and (5) undertake vulnerability testing and
monitoring of personal data privacy and security programs.35
The act also would have enacted a federal data breach
notification requirement.3 59
Compared to other proposals, the act would have done more to
address the storage, maintenance, and use of consumer information
360 mrthan to address issues of notice and consent. It was far more
explicit than the FTC's principles in elaborating on the kinds of
security risks that a covered entity must consider, audit, and avoid.3 61
The bill, however, never reached the floor of the full senate.3 62
4. COPPA
One observer has suggested that the Child Online Privacy
Protection Act, which gives parents significant control over
advertisers' use of data relating to children, would be a suitable
363template for expansion. Expanding COPPA to protect all
individuals (rather than just children) "would command consent from
the individual whose information should be collected." 364 This
approach would legislatively mandate the "opt-in" approach and give
consumers the chance to view the data profilers collect. 3 65 And, it
would affirm that consent to profiling must come from the profiled
consumer, and give the consumer the right to revoke that consent. 36 6
5. Draft 2010 House Legislation
United States Representatives Rick Boucher and Cliff Steams
recently announced a new draft bill to address the privacy concerns
inherent in the collection of information about individuals. 367 This law
358. Id.
359. Id. See generally Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 101, at 137-40.
360. Id.
361. Cf PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 37.
362. Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sl 10-495&tab-summary.
363. Supra Part II.D.; Hotaling, supra note 13, at 559-61.
364. Id at 560.
365. Id; see 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(B) (2006) (giving parents the right to view collected
data).
366. Hotaling, supra note 13, at 562.
367. Stephanie Clifford, Consumer Groups Say Proposed Privacy Bill is Flawed, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 2010, at B3. Rick Boucher is a Democratic congressman from Virginia, and Cliff
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"would be the first law that applies generally to businesses requiring
privacy notice, particularly in the offline space." 3 68 In essence, the
draft bill would require covered entities to disclose their data
collection to consumers and obtain consent to the collection. 369 The
bill presumes that consumers consent to the collection of most
information if the covered entity has provided a compliant privacy
policy and the consumer chooses not to opt out of the collection.37 0
The bill also requires consumers to opt in to the collection of certain
sensitive information. 371 And, the bill prohibits a covered entity from
using information it has collected if a consumer withdraws consent.372
The draft bill also imposes accuracy and security requirements
on covered entities.3 73 It requires covered entities to maintain
"appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards that
the [FTC] determines are necessary" to (1) "ensure the security,
integrity, and confidentiality of such information; (2) "protect against
anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such
information;" (3) "protect against unauthorized access to and loss,
misuse, alteration, or destruction of, such information;" and (4) "in
the event of a security breach, determine the scope of the breach,
make every reasonable attempt to prevent further unauthorized access
to the affected covered information, and restore reasonable integrity
to the affected covered information." 37 4 The failure to do so is treated
as an "unfair and deceptive act or practice" in violation of the FTC
Act. 3 75 The bill also vests enforcement authority in state attorneys
general,376 although it provides no private cause of action to
Steams is a Republican congressman from Florida.
368. Id.
369. Website of U.S. Congressman Rick Boucher, Boucher, Steams Release Discussion
Draft of Privacy Legislation,
http://www.boucher.house.gov/index.php?option=com content&view-article&id=1957:boucher
-steams-release-discussion-draft-of-privacy-legislation-may-4-2010&catid=33:2010-press-
releases&ltemid=41 (last visited May 8, 2010); STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON COMMUNICATIONS,
TECHNOLOGY, AND THE INTERNET, I I'" CONG. DISCUSSION DRAFT: A BILL TO REQUIRE NOTICE
AND CONSENT OF AN INDIVIDUAL PRIOR TO THE COLLECTION AND DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN
PERSONAL INFORMATION RELATING TO THAT INDIVIDUAL § 3(a)(1), available at
http://www.boucher.house.gov/images/stories/Privacy Draft 5-10.pdf [hereinafter DRAFT
BILL].
370. DRAFT BILL § 3(a)(3)
371. Id. at § 3(c).
372. Id. at § 3(a)(3)(A).
373. Id. at § 4.
374. Id. at § 4(b).
375. Id. at § 8(a)(1).
376. DRAFT BILL § 8(b). Attorneys general would enforce the terms of the draft bill solely
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consumers who are harmed through the disclosure of their profile. 37 7
Finally, the bill sets an exclusive national standard and preempts state
or municipal regulations that impose "requirements for the collection,
use, or disclosure of covered information." 378
6. Limitations of Existing Proposals
All of these proposals have significant merit and each addresses
some problems associated with behavioral targeting. The proposals
that deal with notification and consent, however, all have the potential
to cause unintended harm to consumers. 3 79 As described previously,
websites have come to rely on advertising to support their content.
And, website operators are looking for ways to transition other forms
of content-like television and newspapers-to the web, but struggle to
fund the storage and distribution of this content.380 One of the chief
ways the Internet can make this innovative distribution model
appealing to content producers is by allowing those distributors to
market to consumers precisely. Behavioral advertising does this.
Therefore, proposals that strengthen the consent requirement through
opt-in or "do-not-track" methods risk destroying these business
models. These proposals may force businesses to implement a "take it
or leave it" approach requiring consumers to give their consent before
taking advantage of a website's content; 381 targeted advertising is the
only way businesses derive the necessary revenue from their
customers. If businesses take the "take it or leave it" approach, these
proposals aimed at consent will help very little. They will increase
administrative burdens on businesses engaged in behavioral targeting
without improving privacy for consumers, who, as a practical matter,
will probably use the services anyway.382
Further, none of the existing proposals fully address the
obstacles to enforcement of consumers' rights. While the notice and
consent requirements do partially address the issue of data collection
transparency, consumers may be left guessing as to what data
in federal district court. Id.
377. Id. § 9.
378. Id. § 10.
379. See supra Parts I.C and IV.A (explaining the benefits of behavioral targeting, and
how certain regulations might interfere with these benefits).
380. See supra Part IC and notes 178-190.
381. See also Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REv. 815,
825-27 (2000) (discussing the interplay between consent requirements and .'take-it-or-leave-it' .
. . data processing").
382. See generally id. at 823 (explaining why consumers cannot readily "exit" because
"there is nowhere else to go").
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profilers have actually collected, how they have used it, and whether
they have reasonably safeguarded this data. While the FTC may deal
with the most egregious violators, fairness requires that some
compensation be available to victims of profilers that inappropriately
use or disclose data.
B. Broaden, Mandate, and Audit
Therefore, I argue that none of the existing approaches,
including the FTC's principles, adequately balance the protection of
consumers' privacy interests with the potential benefits of behavioral
targeting for consumers. Some proposals, because they focus on
strengthening consent requirements, run the risk of unnecessarily
destroying or seriously impeding even the most benign business
models based on behavioral targeting. In addition, the existing
approaches fail to give consumers information they need to make
rational choices about whether to participate in behavioral targeting
and fail to give regulators information required to enforce
compliance. Indeed, consumers are in a poor position to use any
authority to opt in or opt out of data collection because they lack
information necessary to accurately gauge the risk of being harmed.
Thus, the FTC should (1) expand its self-regulatory principles to
all significant profilers of consumer information, (2) enforce them as
mandatory regulations, and (3) require organizations to periodically
audit and publish their compliance with the regulations, reasonable
information security practices, and privacy policies.
First, I urge the FTC to expand the scope of its self-regulatory
principles to all significant profilers of consumer information. At
present, the principles do not apply to profilers that collect consumer
information for purposes other than advertising, nor do they apply to
profilers who collect data on consumers exclusively for their own
use. As Part I.B demonstrated, the harm to consumers that can stem
from behavioral targeting is not limited to the advertising context.
Nor does the mere fact that a profiler does not share its profiled data
mean that the data cannot be misused or inadequately safeguarded.
Rather, the harms associated with behavioral targeting can occur any
time a profiler compiles a database of consumer information. This
change would also have a salutary effect in that profilers would all
face the same regulations; there would be no benefit to a profiler in
trying to characterize its business as being outside the boundaries of
383. Supra Part III.A.
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the regulation.
Second, I urge the FTC to make the self-regulatory principles
mandatory regulations. 384 As self-regulatory principles, the rules have
the potential to cause a "race to the bottom" effect.385 Profilers who
voluntarily comply with the regulations may face an added burden
and expense. This places them at a competitive disadvantage relative
to profilers who choose not to comply with the self-regulatory
principles. 386 Moreover, there is no reason to believe that consumers
understand the self-regulatory principles or even know of their
existence. Therefore, they likely cannot select businesses based on
their compliance with the principles. And, in many cases, profiling is
completely invisible to the consumer, so the consumer cannot make
an informed decision as a market participant. Under these
circumstances, profilers that ignore the self-regulatory principles are
388placed in a position more favorable than the principles' adherents.
Furthermore, the FTC's principles already provide protections
for consumers that balance privacy protection against the needs of
commerce and industry. They are the product of an extensive
discussion among profilers, regulators, and consumer advocates.3 89 In
many ways, the burdens the FTC's principles impose overlap with the
384. See Ciochetti, supra note 123, at 11 n.39 (noting the importance of enforcement in
protecting consumers' privacy).
385. See David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schanberger, Governing Networks:
Telecommunication Deregulation In Europe And The United States, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 819,
827 (2002) (describing the race to the bottom problem in state corporate regulation). The race to
the bottom problem occurs when competitors choose an inferior lower-cost option even when
they prefer a higher-cost option because they fear the higher-cost option will cause them to lose
to the competition. See id.
386. See Ciocchetti, supra note 123, at 26-27 ("Under a self-regulatory regime, businesses
have little incentive to protect privacy at the expense of profits.").
387. See Bob Tedeschi, E-Commerce Report; Everybody Talks About Online Privacy, but
Few Do Anything About It, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 3, 2002, at C6 ("E-Loan and Expedia began
subjecting themselves to voluntary privacy audits by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 1999 and 2000.
The audits have helped demonstrate that the companies' internal data-handling methods are
consistent with their privacy policies, but they have not sparked much interest among competing
companies."). While seal organizations, such as the Better Business Bureau, may be already
playing a role in certifying that profilers comply with their own privacy policies and protect
consumer data, E-Commerce/Click-Away, Protecting Consumer Data, NEWSDAY, Mar. 29,
1999, at C07, because participation in seal organization's program is necessarily voluntary, it
cannot serve as an effective substitute for mandatory regulation.
388. See Tedeschi, supra note 387 (noting that Expedia's audits cost about $120,000
annually, but that there is "a surplus of consumer apathy when it comes to privacy"). It seems
likely that consumers' apathy derives from their inability to discriminate among the privacy
practices of the businesses they patronize, as well as the difficulty of assigning value to the
differences.
389. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at i-iv.
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mandatory obligations that profilers face under the FTC Act.390
Indeed, profilers that comply with the existing self-regulatory
principles may already be in or near compliance, and, thus, will face
little added burden if the principles become mandatory.
Third, and most importantly, the FTC should enact regulations
requiring profilers to periodically audit their adherence to the
principles, reasonable information security practices, and their
published privacy policies. The regulations should require profilers to
make the results publicly available.39 1 Public companies in the United
States are already required to periodically prepare audited financial
statements to give shareholders and investors information about the
companies' financial status.392 This information allows shareholders,
who would otherwise have no way to know whether officers of the
company were acting in their best interests, to see a variety of metrics
about the company's financial performance.393 It also allows investors
to make an informed decision about whether to purchase shares in
such a corporation.3 94 Under present law, the auditor must certify that
the audited financial statements comply with generally accepted
accounting principles. 3 95 Thus, the audited financial statements allow
investors to make an informed decision about whether to invest in the
390. See id at 20.
391. See also Center for Democracy and Technology, Online Behavioral Advertising:
Industry's Current Self-Regulatory Framework Is Necessary, but Still Insufficient on Its Own To
Protect Consumers (Dec. 9, 2009), http://www.cdt.org/policy/online-behavioral-advertising-
industry's-current-self-regulatory-framework-necessary-still-in#3 (last visited Mar. 28, 2010)
(recommending "compliance reviews" of behavioral advertisers to be conducted by
"independent third parties"); PRIMER, supra note 145, at 5, 11 ("A behavioral targeter must
conduct an independent audit of its operations for compliance with this law, and it must make
the results of that audit public.").
392. See ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 363-366
(5th ed. 2006); U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, Form 10-K,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/forml0k.htm (last visited July 25, 2010) ("The annual report on
Form 10-K provides a comprehensive overview of the company's business and financial
condition and includes audited financial statements.").
393. Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1047, 1085-86 (1995).
394. Id. at 1085. Mahoney notes that financial reporting serves both to aid in resolving the
agency problem and to inform investors: In the context of ongoing reporting, two distinct
conceptions of the function of financial reporting are possible. One might view financial
reporting as principally a form of monitoring for the benefit of shareholders, creditors, and other
interested parties. Alternatively, one might view accounting as a means of providing a
comprehensive picture of a firm's performance that may enable investors to form a better
judgment of the value of the firm and its securities. Id.
395. Theodor Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously?
Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 31, 45 (2005).
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company.
A privacy compliance audit could serve similar purposes. Since
profilers' information handling practices are generally not known to
consumers unless the profiler experiences a high-profile data breach,
the audit could alert the FTC or other authorities to major
transgressions. Of course, a routine audit requirement would also alert
profilers to gaps in their own compliance, and allow profilers to
proactively address them. In addition, the audit would allow
consumers, consumer advocates, and the businesses that profilers
serve to make informed decisions about which companies are the
reliable companies with which to do business.3 97 Indeed, the audits
would give consumers the very information they need to determine
the likelihood of harm occurring because of their participation in
behavioral targeting, and, thus, the audits would vastly improve
consumers' ability to gauge the risk associated with participation in
behavioral targeting. And, over time, regulators could use this
information to determine whether further regulation of behavioral
targeting is needed. For most companies, a compliance audit could
probably take place in conjunction with existing financial or
information system audits, since these audits are common in public
corporations and other large businesses.398
If the FTC were to enact these proposals, it would also partly
address the problems associated with private enforcement of
consumers' privacy rights. The audits would assist consumers in
discovering organizations with noncompliant information security or
management practices, and give them a starting point for investigation
of suspected cases of harm. Thus, the organization's privacy policy
and compliance audit would substantially narrow the information gap
396. Mahoney, supra note 393, at 1085.
397. Consequently, rather than encouraging a race to the bottom, the regulations would
create an incentive system for compliance with the regulations. Although individual consumers
would not likely assiduously investigate the audit results for individual profilers, profilers can
reasonably expect that the media and consumer advocates will make use of this information,
digest it, and relay it to consumers in a usable form.
398. See Victor Godinez, Laws Stir Demand For Tech Specialists IT Auditors Build
Systems to Track Data to Comply With Sarbanes-Oxley, Other Legislation, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 25, 2004, at 5J (noting that the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley act required
companies to have better information technology controls, and that auditors verify these controls
during their audits); see also Sarah E. Needleman, Sarbanes-Oxley Creates Special Demand ---
Need for Veteran IT Auditors Intensifies Amid Tightened Financial-Reporting Rules, WALL ST.
J., May 16, 2006, at B8 ("The need for IT auditors has intensified since most large and midsize
publicly traded companies were required to become Sarbanes-Oxley-compliant for the first time
in 2004, say recruiters. Most companies must prove compliance on an annual basis, and IT
auditors help ensure Sarbanes-Oxley controls are operating effectively.").
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that currently makes private civil enforcement actions difficult to
bring. Even with the information gap thus narrowed, civil lawsuits
may not truly be an effective way of promoting consumers' privacy
interests. 39 9 Nevertheless, in other contexts, the existence of parallel
regulatory and civil enforcement methods has ensured that there is
some recourse for a consumer when the regulatory agency chooses
not to act.400
V. CONCLUSION
When I talk to my non-lawyer friends and family, I love to tell
them about the law that I know they will strongly disagree with. I
remember telling my mother about Moore v. Regents of the University
of California,4 0 1 in which the California Supreme Court concluded
that the plaintiff, John Moore, did not actually own the cells of his
body. The defendants had used Moore's cells to derive a valuable
stem cell line.402 The defendants did not share any of the profits with
Moore, or even inform him that they had used his cells to grow a
product that they were selling commercially.4 0 3 The majority opinion
concluded that Moore had no property interest in the cells that
University of California researchers took from his body.404 After
telling my mother about the case, she exclaimed, "Well, I own my
body!"
The collection of consumer information presents an analogous
disconnect between legal doctrine and general societal understanding
about ownership. It surprises me that in all of the legal discussion of
399. See Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 101, at 101 ("For victims of identity theft, the
principal obstacle for seeking damages through the courts has been the lack of actual damages
suffered - the threat of harm resulting from identity theft is insufficient."). However, the draft
2010 legislation discussed in part IV.A.5 also allows state attorneys general to enforce the bill's
provisions in federal court. I heartily endorse this as a sensible addition to privacy legislation,
because it gives consumers another, perhaps more accessible advocate for their privacy rights.
Another approach to making the civil litigation system more effective is to give consumers a
clear private right of action accompanied by "liquidated damages, attorney fees, and costs for
successful plaintiffs." PRIMER, supra note 145, at 10.
400. See Jay Cook, Editorial, Tort Reform: Corporations Put Profit Before Safety,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 18, 2007, at I IA (contending that the Food and Drug Administration
was incapable of protecting consumers from drugmakers, and that Americans injured must turn
to the court system); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o, and 1681s (creating parallel administrative and
private civil enforcement remedies under the Fair Credit Reporting Act).
401. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 936 (1991).
402. Id. at 481.
403. Id. at 482.
404. See id. at 493.
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consumer information, we have not fully resolved the question of
who, if anyone, ought to own information about consumers and their
activities.4 05 If property is, as our property professors teach us, largely
a way of rendering social conventions about the right to exclusively
possess, transfer, and dispose of beneficial objects and intangibles
into a workable legal framework,4 06 I think that the social convention
would be to regard a consumer's information as that consumer's
property. Indeed, I expect my mother would say, "Well, I own my
information!" People refer to consumer information relating to them
using the word "my," and I think this is powerfully telling. When we,
as lawyers, try to figure out how to protect consumer data, we have to
resort to a complicated web of laws dealing with privacy, wiretaps,
computer fraud, unjust enrichment, and hacking to analyze what
would seem to nonlawyers-like my mother-to be a simple question of
ownership.407
It is likely too late to suggest that consumers actually do own
their information,408 and that we should, therefore, analyze the rights
of profilers based on a concept of a license to use the data.
Nonetheless, the best solutions in this area must accommodate the
concept that consumers think of personal information as their
property, and their privacy and ownership expectations reflect this.
This premise respects the popular social construction of ownership
while still allowing behavioral advertisers and other users of
behavioral targeting to aggregate and transform consumer information
into an economically valuable and useful product.
The FTC's self-regulatory principles, enhanced as I have
described above, are a workable balance. They protect consumers'
interest in knowing how their information is used. They give
consumers assurances that it will be handled according to their
expectations. They give them the information they need to seek
405. See generally SOLOVE, supra note 123, at 638-39 (quoting LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999)); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational
Privacy and The Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1377-1391 (2000).
406. But see Cohen, supra note 405, at 1379-80 (noting how "property language both
describes and determines our experience of reality") (emphasis added).
407. But see SOLOVE, supra note 123, at 639-40 (quoting Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as
Intellectual Property, 52 STAN L. REV. 1125, 1137-47 (2000) (suggesting property rights are not
sufficient to safeguard privacy)).
408. But see New Rules For Big Data, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 2010 (suggesting that
"privacy rules lean towards treating personal information as a property right"). "A reasonable
presumption might be that the trail of data that an individual leaves behind and that can be
traced to him, from clicks on search engines to book-buying preferences, belong to that
individual, not the entity that collected it." Id.
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redress when their expectations are violated. They allow the FTC to
act on consumers' behalf when the FTC's principles are not followed.
They allow profilers to continue using a critical tool for generating
business-sustaining revenue. This may be the closest we can
practically come to actually living up to consumer's expectations
about how their data will be used without prohibiting or severely
restricting consumer profiling.
* *
